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ABSTRACT
THE POLITICS OF PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT:
A LEGISLATIVE CASE STUDY
May 1988
Patricia Bodelson, B.S.N., University of North Dakota
M.S., Texas Women's University
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor George Sulzner
Following Cormiittee hearings, in February 1983, Congress adopted
a system of prospective payment for the Medicare program that was
signed into law on April 20, 1983. This is a case study that attempts
to explain why an innovative reimbursement mechanism that drastically
altered Medicare fiscal management was so swiftly enacted. Analysis
of the events using John Kingdon's work as a conceptual framework
provides a rationale for the policy outcome. The federal government
appeared to be facing a fiscal crisis with diminishing revenues and
rising expenditures of which a major component was Medicare
hospitalizations. At the same time, the Social Security System was on
the verge of bankruptcy because the Hospital Insurance Trust Fund had
defaulted on a 12 million dollar loan.
vii
Richard Schweiker, Secretary of Health and Human Services
proposed a prospective payment system based on diagnosis related
groupings. The model selected by Schweiker had proven its
effectiveness when implemented on a statewide basis and a research
team in the Office of Research and Demonstration in Health and Human
Services had developed a strategy for national implementation.
Upon request of the Congress, Schweiker submitted a report that
outlined the prospective payment system to the Senate Finance and
House Ways and Means Committees. Prior to its submittal, Schweiker
functioning as a policy entrepreneur
,
informed and canvassed the
Congress, special interests, and the general public. Then following
Committee hearings during which no adamant opposition was voiced, the
respective committees voted to attach the proposal to the Social
Security Amendments thereby insuring its adoption. Special interests
endorsed the proposal for various reasons. The hospital industry
supported it because it rewarded efficient operation of hospitals by
allowing them to retain the difference between the price set by the
government and the actual cost of care. Senior citizens believed that
without the proposal, the entire Social Security System might be
dismantled.
All of the effects of the policy are undetermined to date but it
appears that prospective payment may be containing in-patient Medicare
hospital expenditures while increasing outlays for other treatment
modalities. Until the actual impacts are known, final conclusions
v i i i
regarding the meri
the system may have
near future because,
policy are the cul
decades
.
ts of prospective payment are premature. Although
flaws, major changes are unlikely to occur in the
,
as noted in this case, dramatic changes in health
mination of events which gradually evolve over
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The following is a case study of Title VI of Public Law 98-21
(P.L. 98-21). This piece of legislation altered the reimbursement of
the federal Medicare program and changed American health care policy.
Prior to the bill's enactment, hospitals were reimbursed
retrospecti vely for the reasonable costs which they incurred in
providing care to Medicare recipients. Title VI of P.L. 98-21
prospectively set reimbursement rates based on the discharge diagnosis
of the patient receiving treatment. The specific reimbur semen
t
received by the hospital is established according to a classification
system called Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs )
.
In response to the passage of the Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act (TEFRA) in August 1982, Richard Schweiker,
Secretary and Health and Human Services (HHS) submitted a prospective
payment strategy to the Senate Finance and House Ways and Means
Committees in December of that year. Congressional hearings on the
proposal were held in February 1983 and following a vote in both
chambers in March, the prospective payment system was signed into law
April 20, 1983. A national prospective payment system to reimburse
hospitals for care provided to Medicare recipients was implemented in
October 1983.
1
2P.L. 98-21 was selected for study because of the relative ease
with which this innovative policy was enacted. The question to be
addressed is why it passed so quickly when a myriad of other health
policy proposals, with far less impact on health care, remain forever
in what Theodore Marmor refers to as a constant state of indecision. 1
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
This dissertation is an attempt to explain the process which
lead to the enactment of prospective payment. The importance of the
dissertation is related to three aspects of health care policy in the
United States. The first is that health care delivery is a rapidly
growing industry with a significant level of government involvement.
The second is that the health care industry functions in a unique
manner which is a product of its market design. The third is that
there had been little research done which provides decision makers
with an explanation of what influences health policy outcomes.
The health care industry has grown over the past 50 years. The
provision of health care was seen as a substantially private matter
until the end of World War II. Since then, health care has become
more of a public responsibility. Especially since the passage of
Medicare/Medicaid in 1965, there has been substantial increase in
government expenditures for health care. Currently, the federal
government is the largest single purchaser of health care in the
United States. Federal health care expenditures have more than
tripled since 1965 and in 1982 accounted for 10.5% of the Gross
National Product.^ Other indicators of growing government involvement
3in health care include the fact that in 1976 the public sector
provided 42% of health outlays compared to 26% in 1965 and 13% in
1930 / By 1982, federal expenditures for Medicare reimbursement were
$33.4 billion with an anticipated increase to $50.4 billion by 1985. 5
In 1985 Medicare expenditures were limited to $40 billion because of
the enactment of a prospective payment system. 6
Increased government involvement is one reason the politics of
health care policy need to be studied. Another reason is that the
health delivery system does not operate in a free market; there is
both controlled access to the industry and there is dominance of
third-party reimbursement. The use of third-party reimbursement has
been identified as a major underlying cause of rising health care
costs. 7 It is believed that hospitals respond to increased insurance
coverage by changing the style of care provided. 8 This indicates that
increased reimbursement for care insures that providers will provide a
more complex style of care. What begins to emerge is a form of
Parkinson s Law of medical care: "Standards of practice will
eventually rise to absorb the dollars available." 9 These
characteristics question the propriety of applying other public policy
models (e.g., those drawn from public transportation
) in the realm of
health care.
Although the need for research has been established, the^e is an
enormous gap in this area. Most political scientists studying the
politics of health state the need for a means of elucidating the
outcome of proposed health policies. The few explanations offered to
4date, are specific to the policy studied and are unable to explain the
rapid adoption and implementation of prospective payment.
Marmor states the desirability of political analysis of health
policy and the need for instruments to predict and hopefully control
the outcomes of proposed health policy.™ He points out that political
science efforts have been more descriptive than explanatory or
predictive, but suggests that the greatest contributions political
science can make is in the creation of "analytic models and
explanatory paradigms that can be applied in a variety of health
settings. 11 Because of the increase of government involvement in
health care delivery and the rising budgetary costs for health, policy
makers need a means of analyzing a proposed policy to determine in
advance its potential legislative outcome.
METHOD AND DESIGN
The methodology to be used is a case study approach involving an
indepth investigation into the process that led to the passage of P.L.
98-21, prospective reimbursement for hospitals. The case study
methodology has the advantage of providing highly detailed data for
one example and can help one understand the process by which an
outcome was reached. The information obtained from a case study is
also valuable in exploratory research where the goal is to develop
generalizations which can be subsequently examined in other studies.
The case study, if well chosen, provides an example of representati ve
processes, structures, and actions.
5The major disadvantages of a case study are the biases
introduced by the qualitative nature of the data collected and the
'imitation of a single instance which may or may not be
representative. Consequently, a case study approach may be of limited
utility in testing hypotheses, but it is the preferred approach to
generating hypotheses where there is little confirmed knowledge. 12
Data collection in the project included: (1) review of
government documents relating to P.L. 98-21, (2) review of
congressional hearing reports, and (3) review of regulations developed
for implementation. In addition, thirty interviews with those
intimately involved in passage and implementation were conducted. Key
participants included: (1) Richard Schweiker, former Secretary of
Health and Human Services, (2) Carolyne Davis, Director of the Health
Care Finance Administration; (3) Julian Pettingel and James VerTrees,
Office of Research and Development, Health Care Finance Administration
(HCFA); (4) John D. Thompson, Professor, Yale University; and (5)
staff members at the HCFA who participated in the formulation of the
proposal and represented the Administration during the process of
policy adoption. Further, interviews with four selected lobbyists were
held and a review of the position papers of various special interest
groups directly affected by the policy was completed. Included were
the American Hospital Association, the American Medical Association,
the Federation of American Hospitals, Medical Records Association,
Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association, National Task Force of Gray
Panthers, National Council of Senior Citizens, Medical Society of New
6Jersey, American Association of Retired Persons, and the Association
of American Medical Colleges.
Ten members of Congress, who worked to insure passage of P.L. 98-
21, were also interviewed. Particular attention was given to the
sponsors of the bill and their health policy staff members. The
latter included: Sheila Burke from the Senate Finance Committee,
Subcommittee on Health; Keith Kahn from Senator David Durenberger ’s
Office; Paul Rettig, Professional Staff of the House Committee on Ways
and Means; and John Salmon, Chief Council of House Cormittee on Ways
and Means. Selection of persons interviewed was based on records of
their testimony at hearings, correspondence submitted to committee
members and referrals from interviewees.
The organizing design for the study draws upon John Kingdon's
theory of public policy generation. Kingdon states that when the
three factors of problems, policies, and politics join together, there
is a coupling" which opens the "window of opportunity" allowing
change to occur through the enactment of new policy. 13
According to Kingdon, problems are identified by systematic
indicators and focusing events. An example is the systematic
evaluation of federal expenditures for Medicare that indicated a rapid
growth in outlays for the program. Once a problem is identified, it
will not necessarily be addressed in the political arena unless a
triggering event or crisis occurs which focuses attention of decision
makers on the problem. Identification of a problem does not insure
the adoption of the policy in response to a crisis, but it removes
barriers that may have previously stifled enactment.
7The second element in Kingdon's model emphasizes phases of policy
formulation and the characteristics of the policy which emerges.
PolKies are successfully formulated, Kingdon asserts, when the policy
IS the product of a policy community activated by a policy
entrepreneur. ^
The national policy community, Kingdon observes, consists of
policy specialists drawn from executive agencies and congressional
staff units, academicians, and analysts for interest groups. These
aggregates are united by a shared interest in a field of policy and
tend to be familiar with one another's work. The policy conmunity
functions outside the formal political environment, yet, within the
community, policies are formulated with an awareness of the political
mil ieu
.
15
An obstacle to efficient operation of a policy community is a
lack of communication among its members, which often leads to
"fragmentation" and may produce "disjointed policy" that is lacking a
common orientation causing unintended impacts and agenda instability.
To avoid fragmentation, Kingdon prescribes open communicati on within
the policy community .
^
Policy communities, Kingdon relates, become involved in policy
formulation most often in response to a policy entrepreneur or
individual who advocates a specific policy. Policy entrepreneurs
willingly invest their resources in the pursuit of a future return in
the policy arena. The incentives which motivate policy entrepreneurs
are promotion of personal interests, promotion of a philosophy or
value, or interaction with a like-minded group.
^
8The role of the policy entrepreneur is to work with the policy
community to formulate a policy and collaborate with experts resulting
in a mutual enhancement of the credibility of the policy in the eyes
of legislators when the policy is considered for adoption. The final
task of the policy entrepreneur is "softening up" the general public,
specialized interest groups, and the key governmental actors.
Softening up is essentially an educational process which through
informed exposure of the content of policy can add to its acceptance
upon enactment. 18
The work of the policy entrepreneur would be futile, according
to Kingdon, unless the proposal the entrepreneur advocates meets three
criteria. The first is that it possesses technical feasibility which
(1) is developed after delving into the details and technicalities of
the proposal to eliminate inconsistencies, (2) attends to feasibility
of implementation, and (3) specifies the actual mechanism by which the
solution can be put to practical use. 10 The second criteria is that
it contain value acceptability so that the content will remain more or
less intact and survive the policy process. Although Kingdon does not
specifically define value acceptance he suggests that it is present
when a proposal reflect mainstream thinking and is equitable and
efficient in its design. The final criteria is that it be structured
with an anticipation of future contraints. The proposal must be able
to survive the inevitable budgetary constraints, which will be imposed
during adoption, and that unintended impacts are controlled through
the policies design. 20 If policy adheres to these guidelines, Kingdon
9projects the emergence of a consensus that can be expanded through the
use of coalition-building techniques such as bandwagoning and tipping.
The last component of Kingdon's model focuses on policy adoption
which he designates as the political stream. Actions in the political
stream are influenced by the national mood, organized interests, and
government officials.
K-ingdon postulates each ingredient of his model as relatively
independent tributaries which eventually flow together to form a
political mandate. The convergence creates a policy window, which
offers the optimal chance of policy enactment. As Kingdon relates,
"...at some critical juncture the three streams are joined, and the
greatest policy changes grow out of that coupling of problem, policy
proposals, and politics." 21
Congressional hearings on prospective payment for Medicare began
in February 1983 in the United States Senate and the United States
House of Representatives. By October of 1983, an entirely new
mechanism for Medicare reimbursement had been adopted and was ready
for implementation. This apparent speed in enactment is misleading.
The avenue to success was paved by years of activity on the problem
identification and policy formulation fronts and wading in the
political stream. The nine months of intensive involvement in 1983
reflects the opening of the window of opportunity for a prospective
payment system for hospitalization which was creatively and
successfully entered. Using Kingdon's approach, the following three
chapters probe the phases of the policy process. Chapter II examines
the question of problem identification relative to prospective payment
10
of hospitalization costs. Chapter III looks at the development of the
contents of a prospective payment system. Chapter IV follows the
detailed maneuvers which led to legislative enactment of a prospective
payment system. Chapter V attempts to relate what implications this
case study might have for health policy analysis in particular and
public policy in general.
A necessary first step toward the goal of creating a
comprehensive health care program for the citizens of the United
States is the accumulation of better information about how the policy
process can be leveraged to advantage. This dissertation represents a
modest start in that direction. Through increased understanding, a
health care delivery system may emerge which is not vulnerable to
external economic and political whims and provide the key essentials
basic to acquired and sustaining a healthy and productive populace.
11
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CHAPTER II
THE PROBLEM
Development of Health Policy in the United st.atpc
The focus of health policy in the United States has shifted
throughout the 20th Century. Each new policy direction has been a
response to the social, economic, and political influences of the day.
According to Paul Starr, this evolutionary pattern can be neatly
divided into three periods. He labels the periods of health policy
chronologically as progressive, expansionary, and containment. 2 During
the progressive stage (1900-1920), proposed policies focused on income
maintenance for ill or disabled employees. This shifted as the
country moved into the expansionary stage (1920-mid 1970) which
focused on providing access to health care regardless of financial
status or geographic location. The current stage focuses on control
of rapidly escalating health care costs. 2 Review of the development
of health policy, the proposed policy solutions, and the support
generated for endorsement of potential solutions in the political
stream in each stage and particularly in the expansionary and contain-
ment stages, helps explain the problem facing legislators when DRGs
were offered as a mechanism capable of controlling rising health care
costs.
13
14
The Progressive st.agp
The problem which reformers of the progressive stage addressed
was that of income stabilization during illness. Prior to the 20th
Century, workers were insured through sickness funds sponsored by
mutual societies, unions, and employers to provide cash benefits in
case of illness to compensate for lost wages. Such programs had
dwindled by the turn of the century; and after the passage of
insurance against industrial accidents (workmen's compensation),
interest in health insurance (sickness pay) developed. 3
Reformers who addressed the problem were from outside the
government. The group which took the initiative to insure wage
compensation during illness was the American Association for Labor
Legislation (AALL). 4 The AALL presented its case for sickness
insurance based on two objectives. First, they wanted to relieve
poverty caused by illness by distributing individual wage losses and
medical costs through insurance. Second, they wanted to reduce the
social cost of illness through medical care and by creating monetary
incentives for disease prevention.^
As the Progressive Era ended in the 1920's, no policy had been
generated that would respond to the crisis of wage loss due to
illness. The solution developed by the AALL was unable to rally
enough support to ever establish the plan as national health policy.
Consequently, the period did not directly affect later health policy
eras. What is noteworthy about the Progressive era is that, although
unsuccessful, citizens groups and professional associations emerged
who thought the government should become involved in the issue.
15
Expansionary Stage
Policies developed and instituted in the Expansionary stage were
ultimately responsible for the fiscal crisis facing the 98th Congress.
Review of the events of this period is necessary to comprehend the
subsequent need for controlling federal health care expenditures.
There was very little activity on health care issues in the
1920 s and early 1930 s. The country was heading toward unprecedented
prosperity after World War I. The presidencies of Harding and
Coolidge symbolized "back to normalcy," and major health and welfare
policies were given little consideration by either the public or
private sector. Yet, the issue of health insurance did not totally
dissipate.
^
The concept of health insurance was revived during the New Deal
and following World War II. The two major issues were: "increasing
medical costs and unmet 'needs'." The problem was that "the cost of
services were rising to the point that not only wage earners, but also
people of 'moderate means', were finding them hard to meet. And as a
result of this economic barrier, society was failing to meet
individual's health care needs." 7
The increase in health care costs originated during the
Progressive Period, but its impact was not actually felt until the
1920
' s . The cost of both physician's services and hospitalization
increased, but especially the latter. The increase in physician's
fees came from two sources: improvement in the quality of services
due to scientific advances; and increased monopoly power due to
licensing restriction which, by the 1920's, gave physicians higher
16
returns on their investment in education than were, perhaps,
justifiable. 8 The rise in hospital costs was the result of the
transformation of hospital care. Prior to 1870, hospitals were
caretakers of the chronically ill that operated basically as
charities. 9 As hospitals became centers for surgery and acute
medical care, their construction and operating costs soared. As
hospital care became more common and derived more income from
services, their charges grew. 1 ^
An informal conference was held in Washington, O.C. in April
1926 to discuss the social and economic aspects of health care. At
the conference, a committee of five members who were either
physicians, public health professionals, or economists was formed to
conduct studies regarding the social and economic aspects of health
care.
11
This formal corrmittee presented its findings in conjunction with
the annual meeting of the AMA in Washington, D.C. in May 1927.
Participants in the conference, who had connections with individuals
in private foundations, believed that the findings presented warranted
further study. The result was the creation of the Committee on the
Cost of Medical Care (CCMC) consisting of 42 people. According to
Odin Anderson, the committee "membership read like a Who's Who in
Health Services Public Policy." 12
The CCMC planned five areas for intensive study: (1) the
incidence of disease and disability in the population, (2) existing
health care facilities, (3) family expenditures for health care, (4)
incomes of service providers, and (5) plans for health services for
17
specific population groups. Six private foundations
approximately $1 million for this research, and nearly
note in health care and social sciences participated in
research.
contributed
everyone of
the ensuing
The studies done by the CCMC found that, "the need for medical
care as defined by professional standards was higher than the rate of
utilization even among the highest income group." 1 * The CCMC
estimated the social costs of medical care at four percent of national
income. Most advocates did not find that figure excessive; in fact,
they believed people needed more medical care than they were
receiving. This perception of a problem spawned policy analyses based
on the premise that there was an inadequate supply of health care
resulting in an inability to meet the "health needs of a nation." 15
The presumptions were that more health care was necessary and the
government should be compelled to devote more resources to insure
expansion of the health care delivery system. 16 In the introduction to
the CCMC final report, Chairman Ray L. Wilbur wrote, "More money must
be spent for medical care; and this is practicable if the expenditures
can be budgeted and can be made through fixed periodic payments. nl 3
The stance taken, requiring more expenditures to meet the health
needs of the nation, marks the shift of health policy from a means of
distributing wage losses and medical costs through insurance into
expansionary financing to facilitate access. The chief concern became
increasing access to and consumption of health care rather than income
protecti on. 18
18
Nearly all public and private programs of the era were
characterized by the desirability of expanding medical services and a
general willingness to accommodate the interests of hospitals and
doctors. After World War II, the federal government began to
subsidize hospital construction and medical research with the
principle objective of expanding medical resources. National health
insurance proposals reflected this objective.
During the expansionary period, many proposals were offered to
solve the problem of restricted access to medical care. On the whole,
proposals were directed toward solving the problem of inaccessibility
of care due to rising costs. Recommendations for national health
programs were proposed by Presidents Roosevelt and Truman; but neither
could rally enough support to insure the enactment of any national
health pol icy.
Some of the early attempts at improving access to health care
were made in 1939 with the introduction of Senate Bill 1920 by Senator
Wagner of New York, the Caper Bill in 1941 (Senate Bill 489), the
Eliot Bill in 1942 (House of Representatives Bill 7354), and the
Wagner-Dingel 1 Bill in 1945 (Senate Bill 1606). These bills were
substantially the same; the intent of each was to remove the financial
burden of illness from the people. There was no direct change in the
existing health delivery system in any of these plans. The major
issue which led to their demise was ideological —that is, endorsement
of the programs was not forthcoming because most individuals and
organizations considered it inappropriate for the government to use
19
payroll deduction and/or taxation to finance health services for
everyone.
^
There was not enough support to enact any national health care
plan until the landslide elections in 1964. When the 89th Congress
convened in 1965
,
a national health care plan was a priority for both
the Congress and the Administration. The plan did not provide health
care to all Americans, but instead covered only the indigent and the
elderly. The coverage for the financially needy was called Medicaid;
and for the elderly, it was called Medicare. Medicare grew faster and
consumed more federal dollars than Medicaid. Since Medicare was the
primary focus of attention during the transition into the cost
containment stage of health policy in the United States, it is the
topic of discussion here.
Once signed into law on July 30, 1965, Medicare became the
primary payer of health care for the elderly. The program was
designed in conjunction with the Social Security System and became
known as Title XVIII of the Social Security Act. Medicare was divided
into two major components. The first was the basic health insurance
plan for hospitalization which is generally referred to as Plan A.
The other component of Medicare, referred to as Plan B, dealt with
reimbursement to physicians for care provided to the elderly. The
prospective payment system (PPS) of Title VI of the 1983 Social
Security Amendments (SSA) only addressed reimbursement for Plan A,
consequently only the description of it and its financing are relevant
to this exposition.
20
Medicare
El igibil ity
Those eligible for benefits under this plan were persons 65
years of age or older, except active or retired federal employees who
were eligible for the federal health benefits program, and unlawful
aliens or aliens who had not lived in the United States for at least
five consecutive years. An outline of the main components of Plan A
f ol 1 ows.
Benefits
In-patient hospital costs for up to 90 days per illness with
deductibles of $40 for the first 60 days and $10 per day for the
subsequent 30 days. All routine hospitalization charges were included
under the plan except for care provided by psychiatrists,
radiologists, anesthesiologists, and pathologists. The only in-house
physician services which were covered were those offered by residents
or interns in approved teaching programs. A lifetime limit of 190
days and the limit of 60 days per illness were set for psychiatric
care.
- Post -hospi tal care, such as provided by a skilled nursing
facility, was provided to patients following a hospitalization of
three days or more with the patient incurring $5 per day of the costs
after the first 20 days of care.
- Out-patient diagnostic services were covered, with a $20
deductible, for all services provided by the same hospital during a 20
21
day period,
costs.
After 20 days, Plan A covered 20 percent of the remaining
Up to 100 home health visits made by health care providers
other than a doctor following a hospitalization of three days or more
were covered. Payments would be made based on "reasonable cost" of
the services.
Financing
Funds for the program were obtained through payroll taxes of .35
percent in 1966; .50 percent in 1967-72;
.55 percent in 1973-75; .60
percent in 1976-79
; .70 percent in 1980-86
; and .80 percent in 1987
and thereafter. The taxable annual earnings base for the health
insurance payroll tax was set at $6,000 effective January 1
,
1966.
There was no ceiling set on income tax deductions for medical
expenses
.
It was determined that general revenue would pay the coverage
cost of those who had not participated in the Railroad Retirement fund
or Social Security. All moneys collected were to be placed in a
separate Hospital Insurance Trust Fund in the Treasury.
Administration
The Secretary of Health Education and Welfare was designated as
the major admini strator of the plan. An Advisory Council was also
created to advise the Secretary on the administration of the plan.^
22
-Projected Costs of the Medicare Program
The estimated cost of Medicare in 1965 was, according to the
House Ways and Means Committee Report, “in long-range balance with
contribution income."21 Payroll tax increases were set according to
the guidelines of Table 1, presented below. It was assumed that this
increase would cover the major portion of the costs incurred by the
Medicare program, but not necessarily all of them.
Medicare was quoted as an enormous breakthrough in overcoming
the barriers to health care. Stephen M. Young (Democrat-Ohi
o) clearly
stated, for example, "The measure represents the greatest advance in
social legislation ever presented to the Senate." 23 The overall tenor
of the decision to have health care insurance provided for the elderly
was noted in President Johnson's address at the signing of the bill in
Independence, Missouri, with former President Harry Truman, on July
30
,
1965
.
No longer will older Americans be denied the healing
miracle of modern medicine. No longer will illness crush
and destroy the savings that they have so carefully put
away over a life time so that they might enjoy dignity in
their later years. No longer will young families see
their own incomes, and their hopes, eaten away simply
because they are carrying out their deep moral obligation
to their parents, and to their uncles and their aunts.
And no longer will this nation refuse the hand of justice
to those who have given a life time of service and wisdom
and labor to the progress of this progressive country.^
For all its innovation. Medicare did not drastically change the
health care delivery system. The program maintained the established
pattern of delivery of care and remuneration for services to hospitals
and physicians. Because Medicare based reimbursement on the rate set
Table
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by the institution or physician, the government had relatively little
control over the outlays for the program. 25
Medicare is the culmination of the expansionary health policy
era. Through the rest of the 60's and during the early 70's, many
Other expansionary health policies were proposed. Although the
passage of other expansionary health policies was rare, the proposals
were driven by the same philosophy that health care was a right of all
individuals. 26 A recurring theme in proposed health policy was the
attempt to develop a national health insurance program that would
provide health care not just to the indigent and elderly, but also to
all citizens of the country. A major proponent of such a plan.
Senator Edward Kennedy (Democrat-Massachusetts)
,
worked tirelessly to
establish such a program. Several other variations of his theme were
proposed, but to no avail. 27 Proposals for the expansion of
government subsidized health care failed because the emphasis on
the problem of access began to diminish as federal expenditures for
health began to rise. The background of the movement to deal with
cost containment of hospitalization under Plan A of Medicare will be
the subject of analysis for the remainder of this chapter.
Cost Containment Stage
By the mid 70 1 s
,
the United States entered into a new phase of
concern about health policy. Proposed policies began to reflect the
need to control the ever-rising costs of health care. The necessity
for the shift in focus is indicated by the fiscal trends that the
Medicare program began to display. A program that had been initially
25
des to provide a stable fiscal base for the provision of health
care to the elderly began to grow beyond expectation.
Another factor which influenced the movement from the
expansionary to cost containment stage was a shift in power within the
health care delivery system. According to Alford, hospital
administrators began to emerge as institutional leaders in the health
care delivery system. Along with the increasing power within health
care institutions, administrators also became more influential in the
formulation of health policies. The emergence of this new interest
group affected a shift in the focus of health policy from one which
addressed the amount of care provided to one which addressed the
economic efficiency of health care. 28
This change in attitude also stenmed from the fact that those
who were involved in the creation of Medicare did not anticipate the
rate at which health care expenditures would increase or the demo-
graphic changes in the country. In 1966, 19.1 million aged persons
were enrolled in Medicare. By 1982, this number had risen to 29.5
million. The proportion of the total population receiving Medicare
benefits rose from 9.6 percent in 1966 to 12.4 percent in 1982 . By
1982, nearly 97 percent of those over 65 years of age received some
type of Medicare coverage compared to 82 percent in 1966. During 1982
alone, 1.8 million aged were newly enrolled in Medicare; of those who
terminated their coverage (1.6 million), nearly all did so due to
death. 29
By 1982
,
the number of Medicare enrol lees had risen more than
55 percent since its first year in operation. The number of eligible
26
persons who actually received reimbursements under the Medicare
program more than doubled from the first year of Medicare until 1982.
At the same time, the number of Medicare recipients who were
hospitalized increased from 18.5 percent in 1966 to 24.3 percent in
1982. The average reimbursement per recipient per year also increased
from $592 in 1967 to $2,439. The results of the increase in the
number of enrol lees, increased hospitalizations, and increased per
recipient reimbursement was a large increase in expenditures for the
Medicare program. The cost of the program increased nearly ten fold
from $4,239 billion in 1966 to over $41,524 billion in 1982. 30
The majority of this money was allocated to hospitalization
costs. The federal government paid $39.4 billion for hospitalization
for the elderly in 1982. According to the Health Care Finance
Administration ( HCFA) projections, this figure was projected to rise
to $150 billion by 1990. Hospitalization coverage accounted for over
69 percent of monetary outlays for Medicare r ei mb ur semen t
.
3 ^
Consequently, Medicare hospitalization insurance became the primary
target for cost containment reform, and was a major concern of
Congress when DRGs were proposed. 33
As the outlays for the elderly steadily rose, the number of
individuals in the workforce contributing to the Social Security Trust
Fund (SSTF) began to decline. In 1950
,
16 workers contributed to the
SSTF for every benefit recipient. During the 60 ' s this ratio shifted
so that, for every recipient, only five workers contributed to the
Fund. In the 80's, three workers are responsible for the support of
one recipient, and projections indicate that the ratio will be two
27
workers per recipient by the year 2000. The aTOunt of contribution
necessary from each worker to support a recipient would become
astronomical under these conditions. ^3
Escalating health care costs did not go unnoticed by the Federal
government and Congress attempted many different strategies to control
rising health care costs. But each solution offered to ameliorate the
problem was either ineffective in achieving the goal of cost
containment or unable to rally the support necessary to insure its
enactment
.
A short-term attempt to contain health costs was Nixon's
Economic Stabilization Program (ESP). It began with Phase I, a 90 day
freeze on wages and prices in the entire economy. Phase I was
followed by Phase II which was aimed at specific controls for each
major sector of the economy. HEW applied for an exclusion from ESP
based on the uniqueness of the health care industry, but the
Administration denied the request. According to Abernathy and
Pearson, ESP caused problems for hospitals because hospital
reimbursement methods were in fact unique among government contracting
practices for goods and services. It was unclear whether the health
care cost controls applied to charges or to cost -based third party
payers. HEW regulations clarified this problem by defining the cost-
based payments as prices. The ESP limited the increase in aggregate
annual revenue for prices to six percent, with aggregate wage and
salary increases limited to 5.5 percent, aggregate nonwage and
nonsalary current expenditure increases limited to 2.5 percent, and
aggregate increases for new technology and new services limited to 1.7
28
percent. The program was effective in containing costs below the
inflation level of the general economy, but as soon as the temporary
program ended, health care costs began to rise. 34
other attempts to control costs were focused on controlling the
supply of health care. Control of supply to limit the increase in
health care costs has based on a demand-pull theory rather than
supply-demand theory used to explain the relationship of goals to
consumption in most industries in a capitalist economy. The argument
IS that when third party coverage is extensive the consumer accepts
more care regardless of need. A kind of Parkinson's Law of medical
care exists, which states, "standards of practice will eventually rise
to absorb the dollars available." 35
The National Health Planning and Resource Development Act of
1974 is an example of the effort to control supply. Under the Planning
Act, 205 regional Health System Agencies (HSAs) were required to
recommend to a State Health Planning and Development Agency (SHPDA)
whether or not proposed health capital expenditures were appropriate
to the need of the community. Certificates of Need (CONs) were issued
if approval was obtained, enabling the hospital to receive federal
monies for capital expenditures. The initiation of CONs provided a
national means of coordinating health services funding by the federal
government. By 1979, every state but Missouri had some method of
review of health capital expenditure. 35
The true test of success for this legislation was how effective
it was in controlling the increase in the supply of facilities and
services. The evidence indicates that CONs have been less than
29
successful. By 1976. this program reduced the rate of growth on
capital expenditures by nine percent. This record must be judged in
light of the fact that without such a program, the decrease was
projected to be 4.8 percent. 33 when these results were updated in
1974, 25 states had certificate of need programs; the data indicated
that of those 25, only five experienced any decrease in the growth of
capital expenditures. 38
It became clear that the lack of success of the program was due,
at least in part, to the fact there were no general guidelines or
criteria upon which programs could base their decisions as to whether
or not to issue a CON to a health care facility. Therefore, in
September 197 7
,
HEW released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking which
contained ten standards, "respecting the appropriate supply.
..of
health resources." 39 The guidelines required that there be no more
than four beds per thousand population in any health service area and
an occupancy rate of at least 80 percent. The Notice also stated
guidelines regarding supply and occupancy criteria for obstetrical
beds, neonatal intensive care units, pediatric beds, coronary care
units, C.A.T. scanners, radiation therapy units, and end-stage renal
disease units.
A public outcry began immediately in response to the guidelines.
Most opposition was based on the mistaken assumption that the
guidelines gave HEW the right to close hospitals and services. This
assumption was shared by legislators. The effect of the outcry
against the guidelines was that HEW revised them so that the HSAs and
State Health Planning and Development Agencies could deviate from them
30
if they found that using the guide! ines disrupted access to care «
With the guidelines weakened, the impact of the Panning Act was small
to non-existent.
The Social Security Amendments of 1971 mandated the creation of
Professional Standards Review Organizations (PSROs) as another cost
containment mechanism. PSROs were formed and charged with the
responsibility to review the appropriateness of institutional
utilization of Medicare and Medicaid recipients. PSROs suffered from
the same lack by guidelines and criteria faced by HSAs. Without
guidelines or clearly delineated sanctions, enforcement of the program
was virtually impossible. One of the most exhaustive evaluations of
the effectiveness of PSROs was done by HEW's Office of Planning,
Evaluation and Legislation (OPEL) in 1977. This study provided very
little conclusive evidence that PSROs were effective in decreasing
utilization and in fact, found that the operational costs of the
program were actually increasing federal health expenditures. 41
In April 1977, President Carter attempted to control soaring
health costs by proposing the Hospital Cost Containment Act. The
Carter proposal placed a ceiling on reimbursement rates to hospitals,
which was to be lowered over several consecuti ve years. After long
and turbulent debates and negotiations in Congress, it failed to be
passed. Because of the need for some mechanism to control costs in
light of the failure of the Carter Administration's proposal,
Representative Daniel Rostenkowski ( Democrat
- II 1 i nois
) challenged
health care providers to voluntarily control their costs. Major
health groups such as American Medical Association (AMA), American
31
Hospita! Association (AHA,
,
and Federation of American Hospitals
, FAH
,
quickly responded and by December of 1977 had formed a steering
corrmittee to meet his challenge.
During the first few months of operation, the voluntary program
appeared to be successful. By May 1978, the rate of increase in
hospital expenditures had dropped to 12.6 percent.^ Unfortunately,
later in the year it became clear that the early evidence had been too
optimistic and that the voluntary program did not have enough clout to
control health costs.
This was the last attempt during the Carter Administration at
health care cost containment legislation. Other issues became the
focus of his attention and the last year was dominated by his concern
over the Americans held hostages in Iran. In November 1980, President
Carter was defeated by Ronald Reagan who became the 40th President of
the United States. The Reagan campaign promised voters lower taxes
and decreased government spending.
In an effort to adhere to his campaign pledge, President Reagan
proposed an enormous tax reduction program in 1981. The subsequent
law was referred to as the Economic Recovery Act (ERTA) of 1981, and
provided a $3.7 billion tax cut in fiscal year 1982. 44 A tax reduction
of this magnitude had a large impact on collected revenues. The
estimated amount of lost revenues under the plan was $267,627 million
by 1986. 45
The rationale for the bill reflected a desire to enhance the
real growth of the economy which had slowed in 1978 and 1979 and
stopped in 1980 . The unemployment rate rose significantly in 1980,
32
and the belief was that tax breaks to business and industry would
increase the demand for labor. Problems from the decreased revenue
would disappear if projections of the economic growth effect of the
tax reductions were correct and devastating if the anticipated results
did not materialize. 46 Obviously, funding for Medicare could be a
very serious problem if the worst case scenerio became reality. Thus
at the same time that taxes were being reduced, Congressional concern
regarding the rising costs of Plan A of Medicare was voiced within the
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981.
Part of the law required that the Secretary of Health and Human
Services (HHS) formerly Health Education and Welfare develop a
prospective payment system for Plan A of Medicare. Throughout the
first quarter of 1982, the staff at HCFA intensified their discussion
of different models of prospective pricing without deciding on a
specific one to base the model called for in the Omnibus
Reconciliation Act of 1981. The urgency to select a specific PPS was
diminished in February 1982, when Carolyne Davis, Director of the
HCFA, wrote to Ann T. Hunsaker, Assistant General Council, HHS,
informing her that the staff at HCFA was working on a PPS that would
be ready for implementation by the sunnier or early fall of 1982
,
"as
requested by Richard Schweiker in accordance with the Omnibus
Reconciliation Act." In response to the memo from Davis, Hunsaker
wrote that the law required that a PPS be developed, but did not imply
implementation. Such a move, according to Hunsaker, would raise an
"inevitable and immediate" legal battle. 47 Congress, in other words,
might want to have something to say about the form a PPS might take.
33
Unfortunately, many of the optimistic projections relating to
economic growth were incorrect. It became apparent early in 1982 that
the country was headed toward a fiscal crisis. Moreover,
disturbingly, the cost of medical care continued to rise in 1982
despite a declining inflation rate. Hospital costs constituted the
major part of health care expenditures and were rising faster than any
Other form of health service. « The increase was particularly
unnerving to legislators because the federal government paid for more
medical services under its programs than any other single insurer.
Before congressional action was taken to allow implementation of
the prospective payment system requested in the Omnibus Reconciliation
Act of 1981, Congress repeated its request for the development of a
prospective payment in another piece of legislation: the Tax Equity
and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA). In July of 1982, the
Committee on Ways and Means of the House was unable to draw up a bill
for proposed tax reform and instead developed a print which
recommended legislative action. The print was designed to represent
H.R. 6878, upon which the Committee on Ways and Means did not vote.
Instead of voting, on July 15, the Corunittee decided to go directly to
conference on the Senate amendments to H.R. 4961 (H.R. 4961, as
amended and approved by the Senate, contained the spending and tax
provisions developed by the Senate Finance Committee pursuant to the
fiscal year 1983 First Concurrent Budget Resolution). The print,
which explained the potential bill, was prepared to provide further
information on committee decisions which would serve as a reference
point for conferees and members of the public. In it, the Committee
34
required the Secretary to deveiop a prospective payment pian for
hospitals to be implemented in October, 1983 unless it was disapproved
by both the House and Senate by July 1
, 1983. The print intended to
insure implementation of a prospective payment system (PPS) which was
not accomplished in the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981
.
50
The Senate bill, which corresponded to the House Committee
Print, required that the Secretary develop a PPS proposal in
consultation with the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate
Finance Committee, stipulating that implementation of the proposal
would require a vote of acceptance in the House and Senate. The
deadline for submission to Congress of the PPS proposal was December
31, 1982. The intent and language of the Senate amendment emerged in
the conference report.^
The legislative outcome of the House Committee Print and the
Senate Bill was the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Bill of 1982
(TEFRA) Public Law 97-248
,
which was enacted in August. TEFRA was a
response to the budget deficit. It contained a $98.3 billion increase
in revenue through tax increases and $17.5 billion in spending cuts.
Most of the spending cuts made by the bill ($13.3 billion) were
targeted at Medicare. Savings were estimated at $2.9 billion in 1983,
$4.4 billion in 1984 and $6 billion in 1985. 52 The source of savings
was expected to emerge from the control of the cost of
hospitalization. The bill placed a ceiling on the amount the federal
government would reimburse hospitals for care provided to Medicare
recipients. Also included in the law were provisions that created new
guidelines regarding individual coverage, membership of Medicare
35
recipients in Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), and alternative
health plans and modes of instructional care.
Hospital Re imbursement Provisions in JEFRA
In terms of understanding the passage of prospective payment
legislation in 1983
,
the hospital reimbursement provisions of TEFRA
are important because they established a context for the later
deliberations and actions. Some of the key provisions were:
- An expansion of existing cost limits restricting payments to a
hospital for routine operating costs. It set the limit at 120 percent
of such costs in 1983, 115 percent in 1984 and 110 percent in 1985.
- A hospital whose costs rose less than the ceiling could keep
the difference. One whose costs rose more were to receive one-fourth
of the excess costs incurred, but only for the first two years after
the bill's enactment. After that, no reimbursement would be provided
for excess costs. The Secretary of HHS received authorization to
adjust hospital target costs based on a case-mix index.
- An authorization for the Secretary of HHS to calculate
Medicare reimbursement based on state rather than federal standards in
states with their own cost containment program.
- A requirement that the Secretary of HHS submit to Congress
within five months of enactment, a procedure for "prospective"
payments to hospitals and nursing homes. Payments were then to be set
each year based on the institutions' anticipated costs of caring for
medicare clients. This new reimbursement plan would not be enacted
unless authorized by Congress.
36
- A prevision to suspend payments for the last six weeks offncal year 1983 and 1984 until the beginning of the following f iscal
year
.
TEFRA set the stage for the DRG legislative proposal in 1983.
It Placed the responsibility for the development of a plan for
prospective payment in the hands of the Secretary of HHS, Richard
Schweiker. It also established a timetable for presentation of his
proposal to Congress. The report Schweiker sent to Congress in
December 1982, in accordance with the provisions of TEFRA, became the
framework for P.L. 98-21, Title VI of the Social Security Amendments,
Which, for the first time, established a prospective payment system
for Plan A coverage of Medicare.
Hospitals began to view rising health care costs as a problem
following the passage of TEFRA. The fiscal constraints on hospitals
caused by the reimbursement ceiling established in TEFRA hurt
hospitals. Consequently, the AHA and FAH were predisposed to accept
any reasonable alternative (prospective payment) when it was presented
to them in December of 1982. According to legislative staff,
hospitals' fear of the tightening reimbursement guidelines was one of
the primary reasons DRGs were readily accepted. 54
Legislators began the 98th Congress in January of 1983 with the
bleak economy and a growing deficit as the pressing issue. One of the
biggest public expenditures was fixed to a politically volatile
program. Social Security. The funding crisis of the Social Security
Program related to rising health care costs did not come out of the
blue. It was the culmination of the evolution of health policy and
37
the result of some unanticipated fiscal impacts that arose from
previous legislation. The Medicare program that came out of the
expansionary period of health policy enactments was designed to
increase the accessibility of health care to the elderly and through
its enactment, the Federal government became the primary purchaser of
health care. But it was the growth of this program and others similar
to it that led to the concern over rising health care expenditures.
There was growing realization that action must be taken to control
health costs. Legislators were challenged to find a means of meeting
their objective which would be palatable to their constituents; but,
much of the groundwork had been laid as they turned their attention to
this problem in the early months of 1983. This is the subject of the
next chapter.
38
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CHAPTER III
THE POLICY
Recognition by Congress and the Administration in 1982 of the
problem of escalating health care costs as set forth in the previous
chapter was a necessary first step in the policy process. The
explanation of the adoption of Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs) as the
mechanism for controlling escalating health costs takes us deeper into
the bureaucracy. The decision to present a Prospective Payment System
(PPS) based on the DRG model was made within the Department of Health
and Human Services ( H H S ) . When the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of
1981, calling for a PPS proposal from the Secretary of HHS
,
passed in
August 1981, the actual configuration of such a system was undecided.
A task force was formed in early 1982 by Carolyne Davis, Director of
the Health Care Finance Administration ( HCFA)
,
Division of HHS and
chaired by Thomas Burke, Chief of Staff at HHS, “to review alternative
prospective payment systems and to provide the Administrator with an
analytical report on these options." 1
Task force membership consisted of Norman Passas of Ernst and
Whinney, Martin Drebin, V.P. Finance, Evanston Hospital Corporation,
Frank Sloan, Vanderbilt Institute of Public Policy Studies, Health
Policy Center and James Bentley of the American Association of Medical
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COlle96S (AAMC)
- """ — 'l-fPS
-cams. for control 1 ing
health expenditures presented to the Prospective Payment Task Force(PPTF). The task force evaluated each option in terms of its impact
on beneficiaries, providers, the Federal budget, third-party payers
total syste m costs, implementation protocol, and overall pros and
cons.
The eight options presented to the Task Force for analysis were:
Option I: Prospective Payment by Groupings
Variation A: Payment per admission with a
Patient Mix Adjustment (DRG Model)
Variation B: Payment per admission for
Similar Hospitals
Option II: Indemnity
Variation A: Set the indemnity at a per diem basis
Variation B: Set the indemnity on a per admission basis
with a patient mix adjustment
Variation C: Set the indemnity on a unit of service basis
Variation D: Set the Indemnity based on patient groupings
with co-payment. K y
Opti on III:
Option IV:
Option V:
Competitive Bidding
Payment on Individual Case Rate
Rate of Increase Control (on hospital costs/
admission)
Option VI: Individual Hospital Budget Review
Option VII: Individual Hospital Negotiated Rates
Option VIII: Capitation
The PPTF gave the DRG model a relatively positive evaluation.
In its final report submitted to Thomas Burke on March 1
,
1982
,
the
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identified only two potential problems w1th
. prospective pay^nt
syste. based on a case-mix index. The first was a potentially
decreased aggregate reimbursement for hospitals that care for less
complex patient mixes. The other was that-n at of possible manipulation of
diagnoses to maximize reimbursement. 3
Other options did not fair as well under the scrutiny of the
task force. The average number of negative impacts identified in the
seven alternative options was four with no other option receiving less
than three. 4
Along With the PP^'s appraisal of each option, the staff at HHS
solicited an outside opinions to obtain more information regarding the
three options (Option I A. payment with adjustment for Patient Case
Mix; III. competitive bidding; and VIII. capitation) which were most
favorably judged by the task force. Richard J. Melman, Vice President
and Actuary, in the office of Health Policy Coordination of the
Prudential Insurance Company was consulted because of his involvement
in the development and implementation of the DRG model of prospective
payment in New Jersey. The only documented consultation in HCFA files
is the one solicited from Mellman by Burke.
Mel 1 man responded in a letter to Thomas Burke, dated February
11, 1982, providing a brief evaluation of the options and indicating
which option he thought would be the most feasible solution to control
health care costs. Mellman addressed the strengths and weaknesses
that he found in each option, but, cautioned that each of the three
might be construed as a preferred provider plan. A major pitfall in
this, according to Mellman, was that "anti
-discriminati on and free
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Choice of provider laws commonly stifle innovation in this area "
According to Heilman, the foible in the capitation (Option VI, I, wasthat it would encourage hospitals to shift those costs that the
government did not reimburse to other patients who are privately
insured. Competition (Option I, I) according to Mellman, would create
"dominance of hospitals that are not burdened with social
responsibilities to the degree that are teaching hospitals or inner-
city hospitals that minister to the medically indigent." 5
Mellman s evaluation of the options favored the DRG-based model,
which he selected because this system had not had major negative
impacts on the New Jersey health care system. According to him,
a. Prel lminary indications are that the program is savino th P
anH \
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m
l V°
nS dol1ars wl'thout impairing quality of
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C ared that hospital expenditures in New Jersey are now
av
n
er
r
a
e
ge
S
.
ln9 Slgnificant1
* ^ss steeply than the'nat i onal
b. The program provides for equitable charges to all patients
regardless of who provides their coverage. This means therecan be more meaningful competition between Blue Crossinsurance companies. Health Maintenance Organizations andemployer and union health benefit plans
,
competition ’which
will accrue to the advantage of all New Jersey citizens.
c. The program has restored the solvency of New Jersey's inner
-
city hospitals, most of which were financially distressedbecause of the shortcomings of the previous methods of
hospital payment. As long as the New Jersey Hospital RateSetting program is operative, center
-city hospitals in Newark
Camden, Paterson, and Atlantic City need not fear that they
will suffer the fate that is befalling hospitals in New York
and in many of our country's other major cities.
In July 1982, despite Mellman's detailed analysis and vigorous
advocacy and the task force report, the legislative staff at the
Health Care Finance Administration (HCFA) remained undecided as to
what model prospective payment would adhere.
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SChWe1ker Was COmmitted t0 * • x model of prospective
payment. According to Schweiker, Ms desire to have prospective
payment enacted during his appointment as Secretary of Health and
Human Services stemmed, in part, from the fact that as Senator he had
been unable to contain health care costs. One specific cost
containment legislative faux pas identified by Schweiker was his
support for voluntary cost containment in 1979, which was unsuccessful
in curbing escalating health care costs. Schweiker's interest in
prospective payment went back to his consultation with John Thompson
of Yale University during the Senate hearings on cost
-containment from
1977 to 1979.* Schweiker was also strongly inflated by Jack Owens
Who supported the DRG system first as President of the New Jersey
Hospital Association and later as the Executive Vice President of the
American Hospital Association (AHA). According to Schweiker, Owens
had told him that the prospective payment system in New Jersey was
able to decrease health care expenditures and increase hospital
profits while maintaining quality care. Owens believed that hospital
associations would support prospective payment because of these
attributes and Schweiker respected Owen's opinion, having worked with
him, as well, during his years on the Health and Human Resources
Conmittee of the Senate. 7
*Richard Schweiker (Republ ican-Pennsylvania
) represented the 13thDistrict of Pennsylvania from 1960-1967 and was Senator from
Pennsylvania from 1969-1980. In the Senate Schweiker was a member of
the Appropr iations Committee, Rules and Administration Committee and
the Ranking Member of the HEW Subcommittee of the Labor Corrmittee and
Ranking Member of the Health and Human Resources Committee. In that
capacity he was able to significantly influence the direction of the
United States' health policy.
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Schweiker sought support for a case-mix prospective payment
™del Within HCFA. This was difficult because this approach was not
supported by most of the HCFA staff who had come on board with the
Reagan Administration. The newcomers viewed the staff i„ the Office
of Research and Demonstrations (ORD) who had been developing a TOt hod
of setting national health care prices based in part on DRGs since the
Middle of the 1960s, with disdain.8 The incoming staff perceived DRGs
as the product of a democratic administration that was excessively
regulatory. Actual antagonism developed between the groups. "DRGs
became a dirty word" among HCFA legislative and policy staff,
according to one researcher.
staff recall that Schweiker consistently supported the DRG
case-mix model despite its unpopularity in HCFA. An example of this
attitude was evidenced when Michael Maher, Director of the Office of
Reimbursement Policy, was describing the wage index adjustment under
the DRG model for two different geographic regions. Most of the staff
complained that Maher's presentation was vague and incomprehensible.
Schweiker interrupted their criticism to support Maher and praise the
clarity of the presentation. 9 According to Thomas Burke, Chief of
Staff at HHS
,
the final decision to go with the DRG model of PPS was
"a Schweiker call all the way." 10
By July 1982, Richard Schweiker had gathered enough data to
support his position. Correspondenc e from Juan del Real, General
Council at HHS, and Thomas Donnelly, Assistant to the Secretary for
Legislation at HHS indicated that the best of the eight alternative
options presented to the PPTF was the one based on DRGs. 11 ’ 12
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m a memo from Richard Schweiker to Carolyne Davis dated August
4, 1982, Schweiker confirmed that the PPS was going to be based on the
DRG model. 13 Schweiker 's selection of the DRG model was based, in
part, on the fact that there were serious flaws in several of the
other options, which Mellman had indicated. But perhaps more
importantly, Schweiker realized that the DRG model was technically
feasible because it was a wel 1
-developed and refined system which had
been an effective mechanism for health cost control for an entire
state for a two year period. Furthermore, 0R0 within HCFA had already
devised a strategy for implementation of a national prospective
payment system. A detailed review of the development of the model,
its subsequent link to resource consumption, evaluation of its ability
to contain health costs and examination of the results of ORD's
efforts will illustrate the attractiveness of this option to Schweiker
and how he was able to persuade key legislative actors to his point of
view. The DRG option was simply the most viable approach to the goal
of cost containment.
The Development of the DRG Model
The development of DRGs began in 1969 at Yale University.
Initially, the model was designed as a means of evaluating both the
quality of care and the utilization of services in the hospital
setting. 14 Its primary objective was to provide a definition of case
types of patients, each of which should receive similar outputs or
services from hospitals. The following attributes of the model were
deemed necessary by researchers to permit implementation in a wide
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range of settings as well as make the system meaningful to medical and
non-medical users:
1 .
2 .
3.
4.
5.
It must be interpretabl e medically with suhrlaccpc na4.- .from homogeneous diagnostic categories That ic h
ie
,
n
[
s
Se; °i -“I?**"particular patient management process by them. ^
Individual classes should be defined on variables that are
”™°''^available hospital abstracts and are relevant tooutput utilization, pertaining to either the condition of thepatient or the treatment process. 00 r
There must be a manageable number of classes Dreferahiv -inthe hundreds instead of thousand, that are mutually exclusieand evha„ ctl „e they must cover the entir
>
overlap?
diSeaS6 cond1tions in the acute rare setting, without
The classes should contain patients with similar expected
measures of output utilization. P
Class definitions must be comparable across different codi
schemes. 10 ng
Following these guidelines, researchers constructed a basic
framework of case types consisting of 500 different diagnostic groups.
They then began to test potential ways of organizing the groups. The
first approach they tried was surveying physicians by asking them
to define case types using variables which the physicians believed to
be important for determining the type and amount of resources
utilized. This method was abandoned because physicians tended to
define patients based on specific data that was unavailable on patient
abstracts. The resulting specificity increased the potential number
of diagnostic classes into the thousands. Consequently, the decision
was made to base class definition on data from acute care hospitals
with consultation from physicians. This data was examined to
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determine the general
discharges. Statistical
ways of forming patient
characteristics and relative frequency of
algorithms were used on the data to suggest
classes that were
“homogeneous with respect to
some aggregate output utilization measure.^ Length „ f stay wa$ ^
initial measure of output.
The DRGs were then formed by partitioning the data base into
mutually exclusive and exhaustive primary diagnoses referred to as
Major Diagnostic Categories (MDCs). Each MDC was subdivided based on
variables determined by the statistical algorithms. Each category was
then subjected to further physician review. The variables included in
class definitions varied in different categories. For example, age
was found to be important in explaining utilization in hernia
patients, but not in gastric ulcer patients. From each MDC a number
of final classifications were formed. 17 Initial division of classes
was made into 83 MDCs, which were mutually exclusive and exhaustive.
The next phase of development was the identification of the
subdivisions for the MDCs. The set of records analyzed to determine
the MDCs was used as input in the second stage of category
development. In this stage, algorithms were applied to indicate
groups of observations on the basis of independent variables that had
been determined prior to statistical analysis. The set of independent
variables was limited to those which related to the patient's
condition, his treatment process (which was readily accessible on the
patient abstract), along with his age, sex, and in some cases the
clinical service. Groups were then generated based on the most
appropriate variable, i.e., the variable that: (1) exhibited a
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significant decrease in variance relative to other variables,
( 2)
created a manageable number of groups based on a relatively small
number of values of the independent variable, and (3) created groups
whose means were significantly different. 18
The groups were further subdivided, according to the same
criteria used for generation of the initial MDCs. The partitioning
into groups continued until the group became too small to warrant
further classification or until none of the variables reduced
unexplained variation by at least one percent.
This process yielded 388 final groups or DRGs
. Each of the
groups was defined according to the patient characteristics of primary
diagnosis, primary surgical procedure, secondary surgical procedure,
age, and (in one instance) clinical setting.
An example of the partitioning process involved in the formation
of DRGs is seen in Figure 1. The MDC, Urinary Calculus, includes
patients with calculus of the kidney or ureter and calculus of other
parts of the urinary system. First, the MDC is subdivided into three
groups based on the variable of surgical procedure. Then the non-
surgical category is further subdivided into two groups based on the
presence or absence of a secondary diagnosis. In all, the MDC of
urinary calculi results in the formation of four DRGs.
The next step was a comparison of hospitals' performance on the
basis of patient care — related measurements such as length of stay,
costs and mortality to observe whether or not differences among
hospitals could be attributed to their case-mix index. This was an
effort to determine if hospitals with high costs were treating
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Figure 1. Tree diagram illustrating partitioning of urinary
calculus patients.
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severely il, patients with ,ong ,engths of stay or if they were
consuming more resources for patients for other reasons.
DRGs, by themselves, were not particularly useful instruments.
Their value was not realized until they were applied clinically to
Predict resource consumption based on patient classification. Wort
done in the late 1970s was directed toward the development of DRGs on
a hospital
-wide basis. All patients in an institution were classified
according to DRGs providing a case-mix index of the hospital. Based
on them, hospitals could measure and define more precisely output
products in a complex health delivery system.
The major objective was to group patients into categories that
have similar resource consumption patterns. The projected result of
classification was to enable planners to potentially control the
"production process." 22
A software package entitled AUTOGRP was developed to refine
statistical analysis. The development of the AUTOGRP software package
increased the confidence of those working on the DRG based system that
it could predict and potentially control in-patient health costs.
Using AUTOGRP data could be analyzed on an individual basis (as in the
preliminary development of DRGs), on an institutional basis for case-
mi x adjustments, and potentially on a regional or national level 24
With funds from the Public Health Service, Thompson, Fetter, and
Moss (the Yale research team) studied eighteen hospitals' "diagnostic-
related product groups" for hospital in-patient non-maternity clients.
Using AUTOGRP they tested the case-mix differences according to DRGs
and demonstrated a significant relationship between the diagnostic
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groups of patients and service costs. Resource consumption was then
predicted for each hospitai based on case-mix and fees from other
P tals in the area. The goal of the study was to determine if the
predictions were accurate enough that prices and reimbursement rates
for hospitals could be set based on a diagnosis specific indicator.
They concluded
"...Serious consideration should be given to the use of
these diagnostic-specific case costs as a basis for reimbursement for
hospital services." 25
By 1978 the research team, began to publish evidence of the
usefulness of the DRG case-mix system as a pricing and potential
reimbursement mechanism for in-patient health care in the acute
setting. They also began to market this model to health
administrators. They emphasized the fact that accounting based on the
DRG model could enhance management's control over health care, by
allowing hospital administrators to more firmly grasp the production
process.
Further refinement and testing of the DRG concept occurred
during the next several years. The major application took place,
however, in New Jersey. The effectiveness of the New Jersey
experiment provided Schweiker with further justification for his
selection of a case-mix model of prospective payment.
The New Jersey Experiment
During the sixties a consensus had emerged in New Jersey for
increased state regulation of health care. Governor Brendan Byrne in
1 974 furthered that objective by appointing Dr. Joanne Finley,
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Commi ssi oner of the Department of Health. Prior to her appointment
DP. Finley served as city health officer in New Haven, Connecticut
and as an adjunct faculty member at the Vale University School of
Medicine, Department of Public Health. 26
As commissioner. Fin lev's nriman/y p un ry goal was improvement of the
New Jersey health care delivery system through exploration of
alternative mechanisms of finance. Not surprisingly, prospectively
setting health care costs according to diagnosis was the instrument of
reform favored by Finley. She solicited aid from Thompson and Fetter
at Yale to develop a prospective payment system that could be
implemented throughout the stated The basic objectives of the system
were to:
establish a hospital case-mix profile;
- establish reasonable costs related to that case-mix;
- reimburse promptly;
- approve the payment promptly and equitably among payers
according to the kinds of patients for which they are
responsible; and
reward hospitals which perform well under such standards. 28
The system was developed based on diagnosis and cost data
collected from New Jersey hospitals for the period 1976-1979.
Thompson and Fetter separated costs into three overall categories.
They were: (1) direct patient care costs, (2) mixed direct and
indirect costs, and (3) indirect patient care costs. Then, projecting
these costs over a 12 month period, a model was developed. 29
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There were four major ingredients of the New Jersey pragram.
The first was the concept of hospitai incentives. This meant the
hospitals Which provided services at less than the cost allocated by
DRGs could keep the difference. The second aspect was labor and
teaching equalization. This reflected that eleven labor markets had
been identified to account for different wage compensation patterns in
New Jersey. A set of requirements were designed also to differentiate
between teaching and non-teaching hospitals to adjust for compensation
differences based on resource consumption in each.
Outliers were also introduced as a concept into the system.
(Outlier was a term used to denote a patient who did not fit into a
standard DRG.) Outliers were identified by reviewing the patient's
record regarding length of stay. Data indicated that two percent of
all patients in New Jersey fell into this category.
Finally, penalties were also built into the system. The major
penalty was the rule that hospitals which spent over the sum allocated
based on the case-mix DRGs would be forced to incur the cost. Upon
receipt of its proposed reimbursement
,
hospitals could accept it or
engage in a series of appeals to adjust it to a more suitable level.
Once an appeal process was completed, the rate was fixed for the
institution for the upcoming fiscal year.^
Application of the DRG model of prospective payment system in
New Jersey was effective in controlling health care costs. The annual
percent increase of in-patient costs per capita was 11.7 percent for
New Jersey in 1977 and 12.8 percent nationally that year. In 1981,
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the comparative fi gu
nationally 17.7 percent. 3 ^
The National Implementation Plan
Another factor which motivated Schweiker t
model of prospective payment to Congress was
national implementation of the system had been e
l o submit a case-mix
project became employees of ORD within the new agency. 32
The methodology used to develop the national prospective payment
plan was analogous to that employed by Thompson and Fetter in New
reimbursement rate were a 20 percent random sample of Medicare patient
bills (referred to as the MEOPAR file), and a wage index collected by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics ( BLS) of the Department of Labor. 33 The
MEDPAR data file contained charges, diagnosis, procedures, age, etc.
the expected cost of different Medicare cases compared to an average
Medicare case. An example of the mechanism is that of a craniotomy.
The relative DRG price for a craniotomy case (DRG 1) is 3.5, meaning
that craniotomy cases are expected to be 3.5 times more expensive than
the average Medicare case which would have a value of 1.0. 34
Jersey. The sources of data used by the team to compute a national
The data enabled DRG weights to be set describing in relative terms
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Medicare cost reports, the wage index froB BLS
,
and a Medicare
ndex were combined to create a national representati ve cost
per discharge. Thi s treated each hospital as though it served an
"average" mix of patients, paid the nationai
"average" wage and had no
teaching program. The initial price set per discharge was low enough
that the total hospital annual reimbursement did not exceed the
ceiling already set by the passage of TEFRfl in 1982. Expansion on the
craniotomy example indicates the impact of this process. If the
national representative cost per discharge is set at $3,000, then the
price for DRG 1 (cranitotomy) became $3,000 x 3.5 = $10,500. This was
the mechanism used to set the prices for each of the 467 DRGs. 35
Researchers adjusted the national schedule according to
variations in the wage index established by the BLS for approximately
300 different geographic areas. Consequently, based on the location,
a separate price was established and could be further subdivided
within a state into Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs)
and non-standard Metropolitan Statistic Areas (non-SMSAs). This meant
that in any given SMSA, payment became the same for the same type of
case, independent of the hospital in which service was provided.^
Several basic premises emerged as the team at HCFA analyzed the
data for potential implementation. These served as a framework for
the development of the proposal which eventually became known as the
Schweiker Report.
1. Prospectivity itself seems to be effective in holding down
rates of increase of hospital costs.
2. All prospective payment systems require consideration of a
hospital's case-mix for the system to be equitable.
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Take into account these premises, the staff at HCFA designed a system
which could predict the total annual costs for each hospital in the
United States through analysis of the hospital's case-mix index based
on the DRG model. The staff further decided that a technically and
politically feasible legislative proposal for prospective payment
should include the following exclusions from the prospective payment
formula:
(1) T^ e ev aluation of the capital worth of a facility : This
exclusion included interest, rent and depreciation. The rationale was
based on variability of interest rates, age of hospitals, and
equipment which made measurement of these values difficult.
( 2 ) The direct and indirect costs associated with medical
education in teaching hospitals : These costs had always been paid by
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Medicare, it was recorded not to ter mi „ate this practice
Continuance would also assure that the Pase rate related to patient
outcome would not be affected. There are always indirect increased
costs which occur when a patient is treated in a teaching hospital
( m°re te$tS
- reduces, examinations, etc.,. an attempt to avoid
penalizing teaching hospitals for their intensive care regimes the
l-ngher costs were excluded or passed through the prospective payment
system. The recognition of the cost was handled by providing a lump
sum payment to teaching hospitals.
(3) Out-patient care : These practices were excluded mainly due
to lack of an instrument that could reliably set the price for the
services
.
(4) Plan B services: Consisting of the ancillary services
provided by hospitals, they were excluded mainly on the grounds of
precedence in that Medicare had traditionally allowed separate
suppliers. A major potential problem was noted here in that hospitals
could begin to contract out all of these services to increase
reimbursement. The need for monitoring was indicated.
Special classes of hospitals: Including psychiatric,
pediatric and long-term care facilities, they were placed outside the
coverage based on the fact that DRGs were designed to be used in
short-term general hospitals and therefore had questionable validity
for specialty institutions.
(6) Atyp i cal Cases : Defined as outliers or cases which were
extremely short or long in length of stay, they were relatively rare
but the cost consequences were determined to be so variable that they
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had to be excluded. These
institution prior to admission,
to consist of only one-half of
in a given year.
cases were to be identified by
Full reimbursement for outliers
one percent of all cases receiving
the
was
care
State Exemptions
Several states currently received exemptions from the Medicare
regulations because they were engaged in experimental cost containment
P g ms. The states designated to maintain Medicare reimbursement
regulation waivers were: Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wisconsin.
For reasons primarily related to political issues, Health
Maintenance Organizations and facilities that had a "sole community
provider" status were specifically brought into the prospective
payment system. Moreover, it was thought that the legislation should
provide for recalibration of DRG prices by the Secretary of Health and
Human services on an annual basis. The recalibration was designed to
reflect changes in health prices and in the relative price structure
of the country, and provide an opportunity to regularly review the
fairness and effectiveness of the PPS system. It is noteworthy that
once the rate was set, because the prospective payment system was
budget neutral, the annual funds designated for Medicare
hospitalization reimbursement remained constant. For example, to
increase revenues for outlier compensation, funds could be decreased
in the wage rate adjustment to adjust for the growing expenditures
elsewhere in the budget without altering the system's net budget. 39
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Summary
As noted, in August 1982, the stage was set for the Secretary of
HHS to meet the mandate of TEFRA and submit a report to Congress on a
prospective payment system to contain costs associated with
hospitalizations under Medicare. The system focused only on
hospitalization charges for two reasons: they constituted the most
significant Medicare outlays and the DRG model had only been tested in
the acute care setting. The narrow focus of the system minimized
potential opposition from the AMA and alternative health care
facilities. Most importantly, the DRG model of cost containment was
chosen because it had been tested at the state level and found
effective. Still, while prospects looked promising from the
perspective of "downtown bureaucrats," it was clear to Schweiker that
"on the hill" widespread ignorance about the issue existed. A major
effort in "legislative persuasion" remained to be accomplished if PPS
was to be enacted. This is the topic of the next chapter.
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chapter IV
the political stream
Rising health care costs were identified as a problem and a
Policy had been developed to contain these expenditures, but the issue
needed to enter the political stream before it could be embodied in
legation. The proposed prospective payment system (PPS) entered the
pol 1 1 i cal stream after several unsuccessful attempts, as a result of
the passage of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982
(TEFRA). A component of TEFRA required Schweiker to subnit a proposal
for prospective payment to the Senate Finance and House Ways and Means
Committee for review and discussion. A review of the events
surrounding placement and subsequent adoption of the proposal indicate
that the course the policy took in the political stream insured the
enactment of prospective payment.
Getting on the Agenda
The following paragraph in TEFRA placed a prospective payment
system on the legislative calendar:
The Secretary shall develop, in consultation with the Senate
committee on Finance and the Committee on Ways and Means of
the House of Representatives, proposals for legislation
which would provide that hospitals, skilled nursing
acilities, and, to the extent feasible, other providers
would be reimbursed under Title XVIII of this Act on a
prospective basis. The Secretary shall report such
proposals to such committees not later than December 31
1982. 1
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" response to this paragraph, Schweiker began to carefu,, yc oreograph the events which insured the enactment of prospective
Payment. Even before the Schweiker Report was submitted to the
legislatively designated Congresional committees, Schweiker and the
staff at HHS began canvassing the Hi,,, sponsoring l uncheon and
breakfast information sessions consulting special interest groups, and
establishing a system of co™,unication to answer constituent's
ons regarding the plan. According to several HCFA staff who
were involved in the preliminary efforts to obtain support for
Prospective payment, key actors began to endorse the proposal plan
P o to reading the actual administrative report. Carolyne Davis
reported that "Schweiker made it (adoption of prospective payment,
possible" by paving the way for the proposal. 2
As the staff in the Office of Research and Demonstrations (ORD)
made minor alterations on their previously devised plan for national
implementation of prospective payment, legislative staff at HCFA began
polling Congressmen s reaction to the concept in September 1982. The
staff met with members of the six committees within the House and
Senate primarily involved in health policy legislation. The
committees in the House were: Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce,
and Appropriations; and Senate Committees on Finance, Labor and Human
Resources, and Appropriations. Some of the results of the HCFA staff
efforts were outlined in a memo from Thomas Donnelly, Assistant for
Legislation, Health and Human Services, to Richard Schweiker.
According to Donnelly, the general reaction of Congressional
staff was neutral with nearly all of the staff requesting more
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and analysis of data on the proposed prospective^
^ (PPS) 35 S0°n " P° SSlble
- The
-action of the Senate Finance
Committee was supportive. Finance Committee staffers voiced specific
requests and concerns, the most common of which was the request for a
phase-in period for implementation of a pps iwnur ppb. Another concern of the
Finance Committee staff was that although adoption of a PPS for
Medicare patients would control recipients health costs it may
simultaneously raise the hospital costs to non-Medicare recipients and
thus merely shift the burden rather than solving the problem of rising
health care costs. Because of the problem with cost shifting, a few
staff recommended an all
-payer system which would regulate cost of
hospitalizations for everyone. The Finance Committee staff had
reservations also about the broad discretion given to the Secretary to
update rate schedules. Moreover, some staff were worried about the
PPS may have on public and financially distressed hospitals.
Requests were made by the staff for the inclusion of a rate appeal
process and a provision that would call for a periodic reevaluation of
the system. Finally, Donnelly indicated that the staff was concerned
about equity return and the coverage of bad debts under the
Administration's proposal.
Senate Labor and Human Resources Comnittee staff, Donnelly noted,
knew very little about the PPS proposals. The staff's major concerns,
when informed, were the potential for cost
-shifting to non-Medicare
recipients created by the proposal and the negative impact a PPS may
have on the quality of health care.
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saw a need for a more specific payment rate and requested more data on
the system. There were aiso concerns regarding the potentiai for
cost-shifting created by the propose,. The House Ways and Means staff
was additionally uneasy about the future of State rate setting
programs, which presently had waivers that exempted them from current
Medicare reimbursement regulations. And finally, the staff voiced
some anxiety in that the system might cause "gaming” or tampering with
diagnoses to increase the reimbursement amounts. Donnelly reported
that the reaction of House Energy and Commerce Committee was similar.
Overall the key concerns identified by Donnelly at the end of the
week were: (1) the Hill wanted more data on the research at Yale
University on the development of the DRGs
; (2) they wanted to know the
impact the system would likely have on hospitals; (3) they wanted to
know how budget updating would be accomplished; (4) they wanted to
know how cost-shifting would be prevented; and (5) they wanted
information on how public hospitals would be affected by the system. 3
Although there were no substantive changes made in the ORD
national prospective payment system, some minor alterations were
incorporated to enhance the political feasibility of the proposal in
response to the data gathered by Donnelly. For example, a detailed
description of DRGs and their development became an addendum to the
report. Monitoring mechanisms that were devised to control potential
problems identified by Congressmen such as gaming, cost-shifting and
increased admissions were highlighted in the document. Another
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adjustment was made to address congressiona, disquietude, about the
continuation of state initiated expecimentai cost containment
projects.
Following informal polls taken by Donnelly and briefing sessions
offered by Schweiker, other HCFA staff, under Schweiker's direction,
also measured Congressional reactions to PPS. Patrice Finstein’
Associate Administrator for Policy at HCFA, Larry O'Day, Director!
Bureau of Program Policy at HCFA, and Thomas Antone, Deputy Executive
Secretary of HHS similarily sized up Congressional response to PPS.
The "Key Congressmen" with whom Finstein, O'Day, and Antone spoke were
members of either the Senate Finance Committee, House Ways and Means
Committee, or House Energy and Commerce Committee, the three
committees which could have jurisdiction over legislation which might
emerge from the report. In a memo dated November 18, 1982, Patrice
Finstein summarized the attitudes of key Congressmen toward PPS.
Senator David Durenberger ( Republ ican-Minnesota
) Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Health of the Finance Committee thought the Adminis-
tration's PPS was an improvement on the current system and should be
promptly enacted. He envisioned it as a stop-gap measure until an
even better system could be designed that would address utilization as
well as service. He also noted that there was a need for financial
incentives for patients to choose less expensive health care.
Senator Robert Dole (Republ ican-Kansas
) Chairman of the Finance
Committee endorsed the Administration's PPS and concurred that once
the dollar amount could be identified for a given service, the federal
government should prospectively pay that amount. Dole also firmly
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believed, according to Finstpin tha* -4.e , that hospitals should be rewarded for
economic efficiency.
Representative Ron Wyden (Democrat-0reg„„) member of the Sub-
committee on Health and the Environment of the Energy and Commerce
Committee was one of the strongest proponents for PPS
. Wyden called
PPS an approach to give providers incentives to reduce costs because
he believed retrospective reimbursement was the primary factor
draining the Medicare Trust Fund.
Representative Henry Waxman (Democrat-Cal ifornia) Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the Energy and Commerce
Committee stated that he had advocated a PPS for a long time.
Finstein reported that Waxman 's major concern was the risk of cost
shifting without additional reforms or regulations.
Representative Bill Gradison (Republ ican-Ohio) member of the
Committee on Ways and Means stated PPS was a fundamental change which
may be able to help keep down health care costs in the long run.
Representative Edward Madigan (Republ ican-Ill inois) member of the
Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the Energy and Commerce
Committee stated that although he favored PPS he was unable to
support any specific program at that time.
Representative Charles Rangel (Democrat-New York) member of the
Subcommittee on Health of the Committee on Ways and Means preferred a
statewide PPS, according to Finstein. Rangel preferred that a plan be
implemented whereby, HHS would approve an individual state's plan. He
foresaw that the program could be operational within two years.
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Representative Oa.es Jones (Democrat-Oklahoma) member of the
commntee on Ways and Means and James Martin (Republican-North
Carolina) member of the Subcommittee on Health of the Committee on
Ways and Means did not foresee the development of a PPS that could be
implemented nationwide. Therefore, both Jones and Martin supported
individual state PPSs that could be approved by the Secretary of HHS.«
While HCFA staff polled the Hill and ORD modified the report to
enhance it political feasibility. Schweiker turned to the general
public and special interests to engender their support. At a press
conference on October 6, 1982 Schweiker formally unveiled the
Administration's proposal for prospective payment. He reviewed the
development of ORGs, the plan for national implementation, and fielded
questions regarding the proposal. Later in the month, Schweiker met
with representatives of major special interest groups including the
American Hospital Association (AHA), the Federation of American
Hospitals ( FAH ) , the American Medical Association (AMA), Blue
Cross/Blue Shield (BC/BS) and the Health Insurance Association of
America (HIAA), to brief them on the details of the plan and request a
response to the plan from each organization. At the same time, HCFA
set up a hot line to respond to questions any of the groups* members
may raise. Both major special interests and Congress voiced support
for the concept of prospective payment, but admonished the
Administration to move slowly and carefully deliberate over the
proposal prior to taking steps toward its legislative adoption.^
Despite the informal polling and dissemination of information by
HCFA staff on the Hill, enactment of prospective payment did not, at
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least to some professional h -mh uicbb i mil observers " annoa^ .appear to be imminent.
In the latter half of November 1982, a National Journal article by
unda Oemov itch reported that the Administration's prospective payment
proposal would not be readily adopted. According to Demovitch. the
proposed PPS could be an effective TO ans of cost containment, but it
would be several years before prospective payment would become a
national health policy.^
By early December it began to appear that Demovitch's prediction
was incorrect. In response to growing support for the Administra-
tion's proposal. Representative Edward Madigan (Republ lean
-111 inois
)
became concerned that legislative adoption of prospective payment may
be in the offing. HCFA staff reported that other members of the Senate
Finance and House Ways and Means Committees verbalized concerns
similar to Madigan's as momentum grew for enactment of prospective
payment, but only Madigan wrote of his unease. Because the
correspondence reflects general sentiments and is the only primary
source of information prior to submission of the Schweiker Report, its
contents and Schweiker 's response are noteworthy.
One of the issues raised by Madigan was the degree of statistical
accuracy in the Administration's proposal. Madigan was also concerned
about the potential created by the proposal for hospital skimming by
increasing the volume of low intensity cases or by the refusal of
private hospitals to care for public patients. Another problem
addressed by Madigan was the absence of a device in the
Administration's proposal to control the incentive rates, which
according to Madigan, may lead to an unfair reward system. Madigan
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was also worried about the complexity of the cost reporting system
whKh would be necessary for every hospital to possess for successful
implementation of the Administration's proposal. Madigan, like many
other Congressmen, was distressed about the system's potential for
cost-shifting and increased admission rates. Another potential
problem addressed by Madigan was the possibility of DRG creep or
fudging a diagnosis in order to classify a patient in a higher DRG
category. Along with these concerns, Madigan feared that enactment of
the Administration's PPS would obliterate efforts to develop a better
PPS. In conclusion. Madigan endorsed the concept of PPS, but urged
Schweiker to study the proposal further and delay its enactment for at
least a yearj
Schweiker immediately responded to Madigan delineating the
mechanisms within the proposal that addressed the issues he raised.
In relation to the statistical accuracy, Schweiker reminded Madigan
that the DRG model was over ten years old and had been carefully
researched prior to its successful implementation as a statewide
reimbursement mechanism in New Jersey. In reference to Madigan 's
concern regarding the proposal's potential for skirmiing, Schweiker
replied that the Administration's proposal included a monitoring
mechanism that would identify the number of admissions and the
diagnoses of each hospital's Medicare patients. Monitoring could also
discover hospitals that were skimming or admitting only profitable
DRGs and eliminate DRG creep or classification of patients in a higher
DRG than appropriate to increase hospital reimbursement
. To Madigan 's
distress regarding the lack of incentive controls Schweiker responded
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physicians wi, lhave s ome control over th1s 1ssue 1n th , t
physicians will not drastically cut costs or care to avoid malpractice
litigation. Schwei k er also pointed out to Madigan that the
Administration's proposal included a five percent incentive cap to
prevent excessive hospital profits. In response to the issue of the
complexity of the system, Schweiker indicated that the system would be
less complex than the retrospective system and reminded Madigan that
an the necessary information for reimbursement is on the patients'
discharge summaries. Regarding cost
-shifting, Schweiker stated the
situation would be monitored and that this was more of a problem for
other third party payers. In reference to future research, Schweiker
reminded Madigan that there were still several states with Medicare
waivers experimenting with alternative prospective payment systems.
In conclusion, Schweiker thanked Madigan for expressing his concerns
and encouraged him to support the Administration's proposal
.
8 Because
of Madigan 's letter, the mechanisms designed to control negative
impacts were even more clearly described in the Schweiker Report
before it was submitted later that month
.
9
The effort to canvass Congress, conduct informal polls prior to
submission of the proposal to the designated committees, and
disseminate information to interest groups was crucial in building
consensus for the resultant legislation. Schweiker's history as a
Senator enhanced his effectiveness in this role and the effort itself
undoubtedly reflected his Congressional experience. The results of
Schweiker's effort to soften up members of the Senate Finance and
House Ways and Means Committee and interest groups prior to submission
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the Administration's proposal was evidenced by the supportive
estimony at subsequent prospective parent hearings in the Spring
ongressi onal staff reported that consensus buiiding and softening up
also made the eventual attachment of the bin to other legislation
more palatable.
The report reached the designated Congressional members by the
legislated deadline, December iqa? a, o 31, 1982. It described the development
and demonstration of DRGs, explained the resource utilization TOasure-
^nt assoc1ated «ith each DRG, and addressed the major concerns that
had emerged from Congress during the previous months of canvassing.
Committee Hearings
Committee hearings regarding the Hospital Prospective Payment
proposal in the Schweiker Report were scheduled for February of 1983.
The hearings were to elicit reactions to the PPS plan based on the DRG
model designated in the Schweiker Report. The interest groups invited
to testify included the AHA, the FAH, the AMA, and the Association of
American Medical Colleges (AAMC ) . Their endorsement would be
necessary for subsequent adoption of the proposal in the form of
legislation by Congress.
When Congressional hearings on the Medicare prospective payment
system began, nearly all key actors were facing circumstances that
rendered them amenable to change in the present Medicare reimbursement
system. Because the conditions which engendered support from key
actors were unique to each group, they will be reviewed in conjunction
with testimony provided at Congressional hearings. The
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Administration's Dronncaip pos l also gamed the endorsement of key actors
because of its specific design features whichy c
, were perceived as an
improvement over retrospective cost reimbursement. The relationship
between the significance of the problem and the appeal of the policy
although different for each actor, generated the support necessary for
the enactment of a prospective payment system for Medicare. For
example, the endorsement from the hospital industry emerged because of
the inclusion of incentives which allowed hospitals to retain all the
funds that were allocated for a specific diagnosis if the treatment
W5S provided at a lower cost.
The key actors in the enactment of prospective payment
legislation in the spring of 1983, included: Schweiker and the staff
HCFA, the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means
Committee and their respective Subcommittee on Health; the hospital
industry represented by the FAH, the AHA, and the Catholic Hospital
Association (CHA); the medical profession represented by the AMA and
the AAMC; the insurance industry represented by the Health Insurance
Association of America (HIAA) and Blue Cross/Blue Shield (BC/BS)
;
Medicare recipients who were represented by the Gray Panthers, the
American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), and the National
Council of Senior Citizens (NCSC); and the American Medical Records
Association (AMRA).
The Subcommittee on Health of the Senate Finance Comnittee held
hearings on February 1-3, 1983, and again on February 17, 1983. The
Subcommittee on Health of the House Ways and Means Committee conducted
hearings on February 14 and 15
,
1983. The general mood of the
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testimony
proposal and
plan
.
was supportive with nearly every group endorsing the
recommending minor alternations in the Administration's
Richard Schweiker provided the first testimony. He began his
presentation by indicating the need for a mechanism that would contain
rising health care costs. He followed this with a detailed
explanation of DRGs. Co„cl usio „, Schweiker encouraged ^ ^
rs-C 4-U ~ ...Of the coimiittee to support his proposed PPS. 10
The Administration's impetus for the enactment of prospective
payment primarily stemmed from rapidly rising Medicare expenditures
and budgetary constraints due to decreased revenues and a stagnating
economy. In 1982
.
reimbursement for Medicare increased $33.4 billion
with a projected increase of $50.4 billion by 1985, if cost
containment legislation was not enacted
.
11 The Social Security Trust
Fund appeared to be on the verge of bankruptcy and reduction of
benefits was not perceived to be a politically feasible solution. The
Medicare Hospital Insurance Trust Fund had borrowed $12 billion from
the Social Security Trust Fund which it could not repay, exacerbating
the economic woes of the entire program. Federal revenues were
declining as the Medicare expenditures increased. In an attempt to
bolster the economy in 1981, the Economic Recovery Tax Act was passed
decreasing federal revenues by $104 million with a projected revenue
decrease of $267 ,627 million by 1986. 111 Along with rising Medicare
costs and declining revenue, the country showed signs of economic
stagnation. In December 1982, the federal deficit had risen to a
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record high of 1.201 ,898 million dollars, une^loyment was at 10.7
percent, and the inflation rate was approximately four percent. 13
Along with economic issues which influenced Schweiker's position,
pport for prospective payment was also motivated by a personal
action to insure its enactment. The personal reasons included his
desire to make amends for what he referred to as his embarrassment
because he supported voluntary cost containment as a Senator in i979
.
He also believed that prospective payment could alleviate the problem
of escalating national health expenditures without jeopardizing the
quality of care.^
The concern of the Senate Finance and House Ways and Means
Committee members regarding the plight of the Medicare program and the
Social Security Trust Fund is evidenced by statements made by their
members at Committee hearings addressing prospective payment for
hospitalizations of Medicare recipients. At the Senate Finance
Committee's Subcommittee on Health hearings on prospective payment,
David Durenberger ( Republ ican
-Minnesota
) stated he was worried about
the future of Medicare and the "mess" in the health care delivery
system due to cost
-based reimbursement. Durenberger went on to state
that retrospective reimbursement had encouraged hospitals to be
inefficient and spend more money because whatever was spent would be
reimbursed. This retrospective cost-based reimbursement system led to
rapidly rising health care costs, excessive outlays for capital, and
inefficiency in the health care delivery system.
Durenburger stated further that prospective payment could save
Medicare and increase efficiency in the health care delivery system
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contact was the problem of escalating health care cost, he would
have been unwilling to quickly adopt prospective parent, if there had
been a sig„if1Mnt outcry against the proposal, according to one of
his staff. 16
senator Max Baucas, another member of the Finance Committee
(Democrat-Montana) stated that there was a problem with Medicare’s
cost
-based reimbursement which led to uncontrollable health care cost
inflation. He praised prospective payment as a realistic solution,
which could contain health care costs and therefore stabilize the
Medicare program while maintaining the present distribution of
benefits. Baucas believed that it was necessary for Congress to
address the problem of rising Medicare expenditures, but his support
of the Administration's policy was related to the fact that the DRG-
based model of prospective reimbursement was technically feasible and
acceptable to other key actors according to Senate Finance Conmittee
staff. 17
Robert Dole (Republ ican
-Kansas
) chair of the Senate Finance
Committee noted that preserving the financially unstable Medicare
program was a major problem for the 98th Congress. Dole encouraged
Senate Finance Committee members to endorse prospective payment as a
means of controlling rising health care costs without limiting
available hospitalization benefits. 18
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Russell Long (Democrat-Louisiana) believed that Congress
was faced with the problem of rising Medicare expenditures which could
lead to the insolvency of the entire Social Security System.
According to Long, retrospective reimbursement rewarded expensive
inefficient health care because those hospitals that spent more money
received more Medicare dollars regardless of the quality care provided
by the institution. Long stated that he endorsed prospective payment
as a means of controlling rising health care costs and that it would
also reward hospitals that could efficiently provide care. According
to HCFA staff. Long supported the Administration's proposal primarily
because it appeared to be a technically feasible instrument for
containing Medicare costs and stabilizing the fiscal status of Social
Security. 19 As heavyweight Senators on the Finance Committee, the
position of Durenberger, Baucus, Dole and Long were quite influential
in the generation of support for the proposal from other committee
members , 2 ^
At the House Ways and Means Committee hearing, held later in
February, 1983 the mood of the members was similar to that in the
Senate Finance Corrmittee. At hearings on Social Security Reform, the
context in which PPS was introduced to Ways and Means, Daniel
Rostenk owsk i (Democrat-11 1 inois ) pleaded with comnittee members to
"put Social Security back on firm footing." 21 In the same vein, Willis
Gradison ( Republ i can -Ohi o ) stated his concern regarding the $12
billion debt which had been incurred by the Social Security Hospital
Trust Fund for the Medicare program. 22 Gradison encouraged comnittee
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^ d " eqUlt * ble •"« solution to the fiscal
problems of Medicare.
Henson Moore
, Reput, i can-Louisi ana
, supported the prospective
payment proposal stating without it. Congress would be forced to face
nore unappealing choices in the future such as a decrease in Medicare
benefits or an increase in taxes to maintain the current level of
benefits. ^ Andrew Jacobs (Democrat-Indiana) echoed the concerns of
Moore, as he reminded the committee ambers of the fiscal constraints
they were facing and pleaded with the committee to find a solution to
uncontrollable rising health care expenditures. 24
The Senate Finance and House Ways and Means Committee members
were motivated to act because of rising Medicare expenditures, which
were threatening the financial stability of the entire Social Security
System. The 1982 Congressional elections emphasized the problem, and
further, Schweiker's lobbying campaign in the fall of 1982 also had a
positive effect. Once motivated to act, the Committees willingness to
support rapid action stemmed from a previous failed attempt to enact
cost containment legislation during the Carter Administration. It was
defeated because it was "nibbled to death" during a long tedious
process of adoption. 25
The hospital industry association took the lead in backing the
Schweiker formula. The FAH and AHA represented the industry at the
hearings. Michael Bromberg President of the FAH, summarized the FAH's
position in the following statement:
We (FAH) felt last year and still feel that the most
important provision in TEFRA was the mandating of the
Secretary to develop a prospective proposal by the end of
the year. And now that that proposal has been submitted to
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adopt it with recommended changes!^"
9 ° ne and urge you to
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^cific aspects of the Adminis-trates proposal such as a reguest for a provision for states to
develop their own systems, hut overall the association was supportive
Alexander McMahon, President of the AHA, assured the Committee
that prospective payment had the organizations backing:
the‘key 1*
and we will do all we ran
S ' " s t,me to move
compromise between the competing interest'that wilwTb1eincentives, but that will bring us all „„tt„ n change
want us to be, which is a I ?
ut to where y°u all
costs in the ^ars ahead^
rate °f ,ncrease in l»*Pltal
-n, 3 pusicive response was related to the
problems that it was facing and the design of the proposed prospective
payment system. The industry's problems stemned from the fact that
the demise of the Medicare program would destroy the largest purchaser
of health care. The passage of TEFRA heightened the hospital industry
awareness of the severity of the problem.
Under TEFRA, a ceiling was placed on hospitalization
reimbursement rates for Medicare, which were to be lowered for each
year until 1986
,
at which point the rate would be fixed. Within a
year after TEFRA was passed, hospitals began to realize the negative
impact of its budgetary limitations leading both the FAH and AHA to
encourage committee members to adopt an alternative to TEFRA despite
any flaws in the Administration's proposal. Bromberg clearly stated
this position when he observed:
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cHahon also addressed the constraints TEFRA had placed on
ospi tal s, "Our support is the result of more than two years of
careful study of the effects on hospitals of steadily worsening
payment shortfalls under traditional retrospective cost-based
reimbursement
.
1,29
The hospital industry may have been unwilling to support the
prospective payment policy simply to alleviate the burden imposed by
TEFRA, if the policy had not been carefully formulated. Schweiker
included the industry in the policy development process from the
earliest stages of consideration. Michael Bromberg worked with
Carolyne Davis to insure acceptance by the FAN and Schweiker's
relationship with Jack Owens enhanced communication between the
Administration and the AHA so that the support of both associations
could be elicited prior to the submission of the Schweiker Report to
the appropriate congressional committees.
Moreover, the policy, included a mechanism that would reward
efficient hospital administration. If a hospital provided care to a
patient at a lower cost than was designated by the DRG
,
the hospital
could retain the difference. This aspect of prospective payment
undoubtedly enhanced its appeal to the hospital industry.
Another association of the hospital industry, the CHA, did not
provide testimony at prospective payment hearings. Despite its
absence, Paul Retting, Chief of Staff of the Subcommittee on Health of
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Retting also reported that the appeal of incentives which engendered
the FAH's support was not as strong a TOtivator for the CHA, because
its members were church affiliated and non
-prof i t .30 The d1m1n1shed
significance of financial problems for the CHA curtailed its support
for the proposal. Although the CHA was less enthusiastic than the AHA
and FAH, Schweiker and the staff at HCFA worked closely with the CHA's
representative, John Thompson of Yale University, and Schweiker was
able to elicit the association's support by incl uding a four year
phase-in period for the prospective payment system. With the three
major hospital industry associations supporting prospective payment,
the momentum began to build for enactment.
Despite growing acceptance, the AAMC was one association that did
not jump on the bandwagon and actively support the Administration's
prospective payment proposal. John Cooper representing the AAMC
stated:
While the AAMC recorrmends that the payment limits enacted inthe Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 be
replaced with a prospective payment system for hospitals,
the defects and weaknesses in the HHS proposal are serious,
raise substantial questions of equity and assume hospitals
have essentially homogeneous products. ^
When reviewing the position taken by the AAMC, it is important to
keep in mind several factors. First, hospitalization reimbursement
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e!m ursement rates, which were still set according to reasonable
costs and the funds allocated for medical education under TEFRA were
not significantly limited. Another farfr, „ • u .ctor which influenced the
position of the hospital industry; the potential bankruptcy of the
Social Security System and Hospital Insurance Trust Fund, had far less
-Pact on the medical profession because only 20 percent of funds
expended by the Medicare program were allocated to physician
reimbursement^ Therefore, the AA1C had a diminished perception of
the problem of rising care costs. Lack of understanding or input into
the formulation of the proposal was not a reason to oppose because the
AAMC had been represented by James Bentley on the Prospective Payment
Task Force formed by Carolyne Davis in 1981. Despite that fact, the
association was not as enamored with the proposal as the hospital
industry. Efforts to bring them around began shortly after their
testimony. The amount of funds allocated to hospitals for medical
education under TEFRA remained the same in the Administration's
prospective payment proposal. During the first weeks of Congressional
hearings, executive and Congressional staff negotiated with the AAMC
and doubled the amount of funds allocated in TEFRA for medical
education in the prospective payment proposal. Although the AAMC
subsequently did not support the Administration's proposal, they did
not openly oppose it either, which given their prestige within the
industry and the profession, justified the effort put into the
previously mentioned negotiations.
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The AMA, represented by Jerald Schenken „ ke the AMAC, toot a
posi tion of studied neutrality. The lack of support or opposition
from the AMA stems from the fact that physicians were not directly
affected by TEFRA or the proposed prospective payment system. Had
they been, it seems likely the oolit-iraiy P h t c l terrain would have been much
rockier.
Yet to be heard from, and likely to carry great weight, was the
insurance industry. Much to the relief of the Administration. Blue
Cross/Blue Shield and the Health Insurance Association of America
supported the proposal, but both requested an all-payer system rather
than one merely for Medicare recipients. 33 According to Paul Rettig,
the insurance industry did not enthusiastically support prospective
payment because it would be to its advantage if Medicare benefits were
decreased or even terminated and senior citizens needed more coverage
from private sources; but the industry did not openly oppose the
Administration's proposal because by the time the industry provided
testimony, bandwaggoning was so prevalent that the industry did not
want to be left out. 34
A group most directly affected by the prospective payment system
was, of course. Medicare recipients. They were represented at the
hearings by the Gray Panthers, the AARP, and the NCSC. The Gray
Panthers, position was presented by Frances Klafter, who praised the
concept of prospective payment as a cure for the health care system's
ills. On the other hand, Klafter did indicate concern regarding the
potential for the development of a two-tiered health care delivery
system in which Medicare recipients received one standard of care and
87
allots patients received hi gher guaHty care unless ^^
prospective payment rates were appi ied to all payers. Because of this
fear, Klafter encouraged legislators to move slowly and consider
alternative prospective payment systems. 35
AARP, represented by Jack Christy, pointed out that hospital cost
containment was one of the organization's highest priorities because
rising hospital costs were responsible for the present fiscal
instability of Medicare's Hospital Insurance Trust Fund. AARP was
supportive of the Administration's proposal, but cautioned committee
members not to rush the policy "along on a fast track." 36
Jacob dayman, President of the NCSC, indicated the association
supported the Administration's proposal as an attempt to save Medicare
from financial insolvency. In his statement, dayman hinted that the
organization would not oppose the attachment of the prospective
payment proposal to the Social Security Reform Package because of the
serious need for hospital cost containment which dayman believed was
necessary to salvage the Medicare program. 37 Although none of the
consumer organizations appear to be particularly enamored with the
Administration s proposal, the impact of which they questioned, their
acceptance was primarily motivated by the realization of the problem
of Social Security financing which they believed could lead to the
demise of the entire Medicare program.
Finally, the association representing medical records personnel,
who would be responsible for the records which indicated the diagnosis
of the patients upon discharge, testified. Although the AMRA was not
perceived as a significant lobbying force, the testimony from the
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association was an important indication of the potential difficulties
-ch .i 9ht occun if th e proposal
_ 1mplemented> ^^
Medical Records at Overlook Hospital in Sum.it, New Jersey
emphasized that the DRG model of prospectiveP u payment had been
successfully implemented in New Jerspv a , .ey. According to Simons, the
system was so well developed that it did not increase the workload of
medical records personnel. At the conclusion of her testimony, Simons
encouraged committee members to adopt the proposal and offered the
assistance of the AMRA in refining the system, particularly since by
the time Simons was heard on February 15, 1983 in the House Ways and
Means Committee and on February 17, 1983 in the Senate Finance, both
committees were "considering a fast track," for legislation. 38
Schweiker was unable to attend the prospective payment hearings
before the Subcommittee on Health of the House Ways and Means
Committee on February 13, l 983 because he had resigned from his post
nearly two weeks earlier to become President of the Health Insurance
Association of America. In lieu of the opportunity to testify there,
he did present the Administration's prospective payment proposal at
the House Ways and Mean's hearings on Social Security Reform on
February 3, 1983 his last day in office. At that time Schweiker hoped
that the Corrmittee would consider attaching prospective payment to the
Social Security Amendments of 1983 (SSA), which were in the offing.
The SSA that year, unlike customary practices of consideration, were
unique in that without their swift enactment the entire program faced
bankruptcy and the primary source of the crisis was Medicare
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expenditures. The response to Schweiz testimony was oeutra, with
on y a few questions posed regarding the details of the policy.^
An additional remittee, the Special Comnittee on Aging,
, opted
at the proposed PPS at a hearing on February 4
, 1983
. The hearing,
however, focused on testimony regarding deaths due to negligence in a
Texas nursing home. Because the deceased were Medicare recipients,
the committee addressed the issue of the quality of care under this
program. As a "potential" alteration in the Medicare system, PPS was
discussed in terms of any affects it may have on the quality of health
care to senior citizens. PPS was a secondary topic at the hearings
and was only briefly reviewed. 40
Voting Results in Senate Fina nce
and House Ways and Means CommitTee
Following their hearings, the respective Subcomni ttees marked
-up
the Administration's proposal. At that point, each Subcommittee
forwarded their revised prospective payment plant to the full Senate
Finance and House Ways and Means Committees. The contents of the
Bills reflected each branches' perception of political feasibility of
prospective payment. Because Representatives have a more significant
degree of constituent dependency than their counterparts in the
Senate, House Bill 1900 contained more liberal guidelines than Senate
Bill 1. For example, both the Senate and the House Bills increased
the Administratively designated percentage of reimbursemen t for
outliers, but unlike the Senate, the House version did not place any
cap on the total allocations a hospital could claim as outlier costs.
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The ch fferentiat ion between urban versus rural hospitals (absent in
e Arbitration proposal, reflects the dominance of urban
-presentation by subcode* members, rost of who. were fro. large
metropolitan areas. In accordance with its openhanded ideology, the
House based its guidelines on nine versus the Senate's four census
track divisions, opti.izing each hospitals rei.burse.ent potential
The House version called for a four year phase-in period while the
Senate advocated a three year settling-in time. Both the House and
Senate requested that the Administration incorporate a severity-of-
illness index in its proposal to insure efficient and equitable
implementation of prospective payment, fl TOre detailed description of
the proposals and the subsequent compromises will be examined in
review of the Conference Committee Report. Both Committees concluded
that prospective payment would be an addendum to the SSA of 1983. 41
According to Ways and Means Corrmittee staff, the plan to attach
PPS to the Social Security Amendments of 1983 was discussed in the
early part of February, 1983. At a meeting attended by staff from the
House Committee on Ways and Means and its Subcommittee on Health, and
staff from HCFA, John Salmon, Chief Council for the Ways and Means
Committee, who had taken on the role of policy entrepreneur following
Schweiker's resignation, announced that PPS would be attached to SSA
if the legislation could be drafted within the next three weeks.
According to informed sources, it appeared the time was ripe for quick
and effective action. A window of opportunity existed and Salmon
intended to take advantage by attaching the prospective payment
proposal to the 1983 Social Security Amendments. 4 ^
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According to Salmon, his impetus for piacing prospective pay«„t
on the "fast tract" emerged for several reasons, one of which was that
he had witnessed the defeat of Carter's cost
-contains efforts in
1977-1979 and wanted to avoid a simiiar outcome for prospective
payment. Another rationale cited by Salmon for attachment of
Prospective payment to the Social Security Amendments was that due to
the early lobbying efforts of Schweiker and his staff and the growing
distress regarding the financial insolvency of Social Security, there
was a ground swell of support for the strategy. These factors coupled
with endorsement of the tactic by Representative Daniel Rostenkowski
( Democ rat - 1 1 1 ino i s ) , Chairman of Ways and Means, motivated Salmon to
pursue swift adoption of prospective payment. 43 The Administration and
members of the House Cormnttee on Ways and Means and the Subcormittee
on Health worked together to draft the bill (H. R. 1900). The Ways and
Means Committee was the only House Committee involved in its
development. There was some controversy surrounding this decision
when Representative Henry Waxman (Democrat-Cal if ornia
) requested that
the Subcommittee on Health of the Energy and Interstate Commerce
Committee, of which he was chair, review the proposal before it went
to the floor of the House. Because the bill only affected hospitals'
in-patient services for Medicare recipients, the Comnittee on Ways and
Means was able to maintain sole control over the bill prior to its
placement as an attachment to the SSA in the Committee meeting on
March 4, 1983. 44 It was evident that Medicare was not part of the
Energy and Commerce Committee's jurisdiction and therefore, the
Speaker of the House would have surely upheld a recommendation of the
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*>« «d C_,„,
«-»» „„„ „„„„ „ ,„hir „ rtliM mone of his staff, was the fact that there was general acceptance of
the prospective payment proposal in the House and from special
interest groups. Consequently, Waxman did not perceive a need for him
to advocate a position contrary to the proposal being taken by the
Ways and Means Corrmittee. 45
The individual who "hammered out" the Senate's analogous
legislative package was Sheila Burke, Assistant to the Senate Majority
Leader. In conjunction with Salmon, she worked with the Senate
Subcommittee on Health of the Finance Committee as it developed its
version of prospective payment (Senate Bill i)
,
which was attached to
the Social Security Amendments by the Senate Finance Committee on
March 3 , 1983. The fact that Schweiker had left the Senate less than
two years prior to the hearings on prospective payment enhanced his
credibility with his former colleagues when he testified before them
as Secretary of HHS. Consequently, Senate staff were less intimately
involved in the adoption of prospective payment than their
counterparts in House. 46
Once both Cormittees agreed to attach prospective payment to the
amendments, it became known as Title VI and was thereafter heard only
in closed hearings. 47 According to Rettig, once the decision to attach
the prospective payment proposal to the Social Security Amendments had
been made, the proposal developed a "full head of steam" and its
passage took on an image of "inevitability, .. 48
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Following its attachment to the Social c or - + „s Security Amendments,
prospective payment became a part of thp i 0^ i + •e r e legislative agenda to be
addressed by Congress-as
-a-whol e Staff nn hnth u* s o both House and Senate
Committees observed that ac t-i+i^ \/tas Title VI of the Amendments, the PPS was
perceived by congressmen as a "little southing tacked on to Social
Security" that was noncontroversial and appeared to be an effective
mechanism for the containment of rising federal health care
expenditures /9 Under these circumstances, success appeared to be
guaranteed
.
The Social Security Amendments, following three days of closed
hearings were received in the House on March 14, 1983 and placed on
the House calendar. On March 23, 1983 the Bill (H.R. 1900) was passed
by a 243 to 102 margin. H.R. 1900 was received in the Senate on March
14, 1983 and placed on the Senate calendar. On March 23, 1983 it was
passed by a roll call vote of 88 yeas and 9 nays. 5^
Conference Report
Because the House and Senate bills differed in significant
aspects, a conference committee was formed. In a conference on March
23, 1983, which was described by a HCFA staff as a "free-for-all," the
differences were resolved. 51 ’ 52 The major issues that created
obstacles between the House and Senate, as earlier stated were
outliers, the urban/rural split, regionalism and the lack of a
severity of illness index in the system. The results of the sessions
were reflected in the conference amendments. 52
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In reference to outliprs the y ,
.
,
•
the Adml
"i5tration, Senate, and House
0 U" qUe P° Siti0nS re9ardin9 (0 the definition of an outlier;
, 2)the proportion of total DRG reimburse^ that would be expended for
-tilers; and
,3, the means of determining the reimbursement rate for
According to the Administration's proposal, outliers were
defined as "atypical cases" that could not exceed more than one half
percent of reported cases, and would be reimbursed at a rate
determined by the Secretary of HHS. The Senate bill defined outliers
a clients whose length of stay exceeds an undetermined number over
the mean length of stay or standard deviation from that mean,
whichever was less. The proportion of total cases that could be
reimbursed under the Senate's bill was set at not less than five
percent, but not over six percent. The rate of reimbursement in the
Senate's bill was to be determined by the Secretary of HHS based on
approximated marginal costs. The House bill defined outliers as cases
which exceeded the DRG designated length of stay by over thirty days
and limited the proportion of possible outliers to not less than four
percent of all cases. The Secretary of HHS was to determine the rate
of outlier reimbursement
.
The conference amendment followed the Senate's bill in all three
areas, definition, total proportion of reimbursement allocated to
outliers, and reimbursement rate-setting. The Senate's amendment was
selected, as reported by informed staff, because it had the highest
degree of technical feasibility of the three proposals.
There was also controversy regarding the urban/rural reimburse-
ment adjustments. The Administration's proposal did not contain a
95
differentiating urban from rural hospitals. The Senate,
'’I' addreSS6d ^ diff— “^an and rural hospitals by
apply mg separate rates of payments to urban and rural ^ ^ ^
the four census regions. The House bill, on the other hand, app, ied
separate parent rates to urban and rurai areas based on the nine
census divisions. The conference agreement followed the House bill
because it more clearly delineated the rei.burse.ent trends of each
section of the country.
A Similar controversy, emerged regarding the issue of regional
reimbursement adjustments during PPS's phase-in period. The
Administration's proposal did not contain a provision addressing the
issue. The Senate bill required regional reimbursement adjustments
based on the four census regions which would no longer apply after the
third year of implementation. The House bill required regional
reimbursement adjustments based on the nine census divisions which
would no longer apply after the fourth year of implementation. As a
compromise the conference agreed to base the regional reimbursement
modifications on the nine census divisions, but the adjustment would
no longer apply after the third year of implementation of the system.
The final major obstacle facing conferees was the determination
of a mechanism that would address the perceived lack of a severity-of-
illness index in the Administration's proposal. The Administration's
proposal did not contain a specific severity-of-illness index, because
it believed that that measurement was inherent in the design of DRGs.
The Senate and House bills contained similar provisions that
indirectly addressed the issue. The conference agreed to maintain
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;
Pe
;
1mental $tate
programs, which may eventually
eve op a useful severity-of-i,i ness Index and to establish a panel of
experts that would conduct studies and issue reports on the effects
the prospective payment system based on DRGs had on hospitals
Medicare recipients, and health care expenditures.
Other less controversial details regarding the Administration of
prospective payment were also address*! by the conference committee.
Sellar impetus to contain rising Medicare expenditures without
jeopardizing the quality of care motivated Congress and the
Administration to develop a legislative package that was acceptable to
both. Consequently, the Conference Report was not drastically
different from the Administration's proposal. Specific regulations
such as the definition and reimbursement rates for outliers and
delineation of geographic regions did not affect the basic premise of
prospectively determining a resource allocation for any given
diagnosis. Also, because the system was budget neutral, revenues for
increased allocations in one area were raised by decreasing
expenditures for another. For example, the funds for increased
outlier compensation could be obtained by decreasing each DRG price
designation by a minute amount.
On March 24, 1 983 both the House and Senate approved the
Conference Report. The bill was signed into law (Public Law 98-21) by
President Reagan on April 20, 1983, altering the original
reimbursement mechanism for Medicare. 54
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Implementation
The process of Elementing Publ ic Law 98 - 21 (P
. L
. 98 . 21)> TUle
relatively easy. The law was concisely written with regulatory
1 mil tations clearly del ineated so that there were very few technical
q mng the attention of HCFA staff prior to implementation
of the law in October 1983. Julian Pettingil, and other staff i„ ORD
of HCFA had completed the necessary wor k for implementation before
preparing the Schweiker Report. According to one staff member, this
greatly facilitated implementation. 55
Summary
The adoption of prospective payment seems remarkably swift yet,
in reality, represented months and years of preliminary efforts. The
problem of rising federal health expenditures had reached monumental
proportions, and the plan had been developed and tested for more than
a decade prior to its incorporation into legislation. By the time the
Schweiker Report was submitted to the appropriate committees, the
Administration had actively engaged in conminicati ng and persuading
the key actors involved in the adoption process. Schweiker's
unambiguous advocacy and his creative leadership produced a ground
swell of endorsement which assured smooth passage. The consequence of
the preliminary efforts was the development of a momentum of support
giving the policy an image of inevitability. Thus, the unique
circumstances which served as a precursor for the placement of a well
designed policy on the legislative agenda and the subsequent
effectively executed lobbying strategy go a long way to providing an
98
adequate explanation ton legislative adoption of prospective parent.
The concluding chapter explores the lessons to be learned from this
case history of policy enactment for a broader understanding of how
policy issues are addressed at the national level of government.
99
References Cit.Pd
^Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982.
FlnanceSfdminl stratioV,
6
August leT^lsef
DaViS
’ Director Health Care
1982^™ from Thomas Donnelly ^ $ecreta^ R .char(j schwe . k^
18
.
1982.
ernal mem° fr0m Th0mas to Richard Schweiker, November
Ibid.
RichardTc^weiker^December^lf^Sz'!^
3^ Ve “Wd Madi 9an to Secretary
0ece!be°r
r
9!
S
l
P
98^
enCe fr0m SeCretar > Schweiker to Edward Madigan,
for Poi
e
icy7HCFA!
e
july
W
29!
t
1985!
r1Ce FinStein
'
Assoc1ate Administrator
o r|
C
:
Ife a
f
"t
h
°o
f*
tli e ommuTe e o
n
ance, United States Senate, February 2, 1983. (No. 98-60
,
Part 1)
U Schweiker Richard in memo to Carolyne Davis, September 22 198?And personal interview with Schweiker, June 19, 1985.
*
1
2
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981.
Ma n n^
H
Thomas^Tnd ftrstein\°Norman ^Eds 1^982^*\heTAmerican
rjfhc
1
p
n
oli°cy%
1
e
9
s
8
earch
WaShin9t0n: ^erprlsrinimute for
14 Personal interview with Richard Schweiker, Secretary Health and
Human Services, June 17, 1985.
15 Testimony of Senator David Durenberger at Hearings on Prospective
Payment of Senate Finance Committee, p. 13.
16 Ibid.
17 Testimony of Senator Max Baucas at Senate Hearings 98 - 60
,
p. 48.
100
Testimony of Senator Robert Dole at Senate Heari
Testimony Russell Long at Senate Heari
ngs 98-60
, p. 50.
ngs 98-60.
u
Policy^HCFAHul'y 29^ 1985^
FinStein
> As sociate Administrator for
2
1
Test i mony of Daniel
Committee Hearings on Social
2, 3, 1983, p. 3 .
Rostenkowski at Hous
Security Reform, Serial
e Ways and Means
98-3, February 1
,
22 Test i mony
Hearings, Serial
of Willis
98-3.
Grad i son at House Ways and Means Comnittee
2 3Testimony of Hens
the House Ways and Mean
1983.
on Moore before the Subcommittee on Health of
s Committee, Serial 98-6, February 15
,
15
,
24 t 4. •
House ^UayV and^Means'," Serial ^98-6
.
bef 0re Subcommittee on Health of the
25 Personal interview with Paul Retting.
26Testimony of Michael Bromberg before Senate Finanrp rnmmiff
Subcomnittee on Health, Serial 98 - 60
, pp. 93 -99 .
Committee
^Testimony of Alexander McMahon, President of the AmericanHospital Association at S. Hrg. 98-60
.
28 Ibid., Bromberg testimony.
29
Ibid., McMahon testimony.
3 n
^Personal Interview with Paul
Subcommittee on Health of House Wavs
1986 .
R e 1 1 i g
,
and Means
Chief of Staff
Committee, July
of
9,
..
^ Testimony of John A. D. Cooper for the American Association of
Medical Colleges.
32 Fessler, Pamela. Soaring health care costs for the elderly: A
problem browing worse every year. Congressional Quarterly, November
28, 1981, pp. 2337-2341 .
33Testimony of Bernard Treshnowski at Senate Hearing No. 98-60
.
34 Interview with Paul Rettig.
35 Testimony of Frances Klafter at Senate Hearing No. 98-60
.
101
36
37
38
Testimony of Jack Christy at Senate Hearing No. 98-60
.
Testimony of Jacob Clyman at Senate Hearing No. 98-60.
Testimony of Sally Simons at Senate Hearing No. 98 - 60 .
Committed
1
o
m
n°w
y
ay
0
s
f
a^Means ^“th^Hous^ of
h
p
"ear in 9 s
.
before the
3, 1983. (Serial 98 - 3 )
j Representative, February
Committee on Aging^tte ^ Hearings before the Special
1983.
y UnUed States Se nate, 98-168, February 4,
H.R. 1900T
11 tte(? ReporU from Senate Finance and House Ways and Means,
42
Ways an(Tteans
1
Comm-fttee? N 0vember° 5^ m™"'
^ ° f Staff of House
43
44
45
Ibid.
Interview with Waxman staff on May 26
,
1987.
Ibid.
46
Personal Interviews with Paul Retting and Sheila Burke.
24, 198
C
3" ferenCe ReP° rt N °- 98 ' 47 ’ 98th Con9res s > 1st Session, March
48 Personal interview with Paul Retting, Professional Staff ofHouse Ways and Means Committee, July 9, 1986.
49 Personal Interview with Sheila Burke, Assistant to the SenateMajority Leader, June 18, 1985.
50 Topical Law Revi ew of Congressional Record s, pp. 25,161 and
£0
,
162
.
“
c 1
Ibid., Conference Report No. 98-47
.
(TO
Ibid., Personal interview with Patrice Finstein.
Ibid., Personal interview with Sheila Burke.
1 b id
. ,
Conference Report No. 98-47.
55 Personal interview with Michael Maher, Director of Office of
Reimbursement Policy, HCFA, July 3, 1986.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
On October 1
, 1983 the Federal government implemented a new
system of reimbursement for hospitalizations under Medicare. The new
system changed the cost based retrospective payment mechanism to one
Wh,ch prospectively set the reimbursement amount according to the
patients diagnostic classification. The alteration in reimbursed
policy was implemented less than ten months after the first public
hearings were held in the Congress in February 1983
.
The analytic framework which is most helpful in explaining the
swift passage of prospective payment is that offered by John Kingdon.
As detailed in the Introduction, Kingdon postulates that the
convergence of problem recognition, policy feasibility, and political
acceptability produces legislative enactment. 1
According to Kingdon, as noted, problems are identified by
systematic indicators or focusing events and come to the fore by means
of a triggering mechanism or crisis. The systematic indicators in
this case that signaled a need to control national health expenditures
were the annually increasing Medicare outlays coupled with annually
declining federal revenues. The event which focused national
awareness on the issue was the 1982 congressional elections in which
the economic instability of the nation and the Social Security system
were highlighted by the candidates. Even with an enhanced national
102
103
awareness of the impending problem during the '82
may not have been placed on the legislative
elections, the issue
agenda without the
existence of a crisis and subsequent triggering mechanism.
The crisis which forced the Congress to address rising health
care expenditures was the potential demise of the entire Social
Security System. The System was near bankruptcy in 1982 and the
problem exacerbated when the Hospital Insurance Trust Fund defaulted
on a $12 million loan it had received from Social Security Trust Fund.
In 1982, faced with a need to act. Congress legislated TEFRfl,
which became the triggering mechanism for enactment of prospective
payment. TEFRA required the Administration to develop a proposal to
address the issue of rising expenditures for Medicare
hospitalizations. Simultaneously, it placed a financial burden on the
hospital industry which led them to accept an alternative reimburse-
ment mechanism in 1983.
Although the problem was becoming obvious to key legislators,
involved interests, and the attentive public, a policy that could
solve the crisis had not emerged. The proposal had to be palatable to
those responsible for its enactment and implementation. A review of
the Schweiker Report against the backdrop of Kingdon's deliniation of
the ingredients of successful policy further illuminates why
prospective payment was rapidly enacted because its development
appears to adhere to Kingdon's guidelines. The foundation of the
system rested on the operational adequacy of DRGs
,
which had been
incubated in academic think tanks prior to their selection by the
Administration as the basis of the Schweiker Report.
104
Fragmentation within the policy comity, which Kingdom cites asdetrimental to the foliation of a cohesive po, icy, was minimal
because direct channeis of education among its members were
assured by the formation of the Prospective Payment Task Force.
Fd lowing the deliberations of the Task Force and further consultation
wUhin the Administration, Richard Schweiker became the policy
entrepreneur who worked to insure acceptance of the proposed policy.
He was extremely effective in the position of policy entrepreneur at
softening up key actors because he had served as a Senator (1969-1980)
during Which time he was heavily involved with the development of
health policies. Schweiker's effectiveness as an entrepreneur was
enhanced further by his firm belief that prospective payment could
control rising health costs without jeopardizing the quality of care.
Furthermore, a prospective payment system based on DRGs possessed
attributes which would enhance its acceptability in, to use Kingdom's
term, "the political stream." The primary attribute in the prospective
payment proposal was that it promoted efficient operation of hospitals
by rewarding hospitals that could provide care at a cost lower than
the D RG determined rate. They could keep the difference and allocate
it as they pleased. Schweiker pushed this feature when he sought
support for the proposal from the hospital associations. The
technical feasibility of the prospective payment plan was assured
through earlier implementation of a similar system in New Jersey, an
experience which indicated that prospective pricing of health care
could contain costs without significantly altering the quality of
care.
The proposal was also designed to control only Medicare hospital
expenditures so as to insure technical feasibility. The decision to
target Medicare recipients was based on the fact that related costs
could be m°re centrally and unifor m ,y regulated than fragmented
programs such as Medicaid. The decentralization of and state
involvement in other federally subsidized health care programs would
have made implementation of a comprehensive prospective payment system
too disjointed and complex to assure likely success. Moreover, DRGs
had been designed, tested, and applied only at/on in-patient acute
care hospitals costs, therefore the technical feasibility of the
proposal when applied to other settings was unknown. Finally, the
Schweiker policy anticipated future concerns by providing specific
mechanisms to deal with potential implementation difficulties such as
cost-shifting, skimming, gaming, DRG creep, diminished quality of
care, and excessive decrease in the length of hospitalization.
As prospective payment entered the political arena, Schweiker
began to choreograph events surrounding legislative adoption as if
following the recipe provided by Kingdon. He set the stage by
emphasizing the fiscal insolvency of the Medicare program and its
potential for bankrupting Social Security. The press reinforced his
position and published articles which predicted the demise of the
nation's largest social program for the elderly. Using this base as a
springboard, Schweiker began to lobby for his prospective payment
plan, which he touted as a mechanism that would put Medicare on solid
financial footing without diminishing benefits.
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The canvassing and educational efforts nf <: rhrr o Schweiker and his staff
enhanced the genera! acceptabi,Uy of prospective parent. Through
e process. Congressmen became
.one familiar with the plan and $Uff
at HHS were a ble to predict congressional concerns and incorporate
appropnate responses into the document prior to distribution.
Schweiker was also a willing and effective negotiator as
Rostrated by his handling of the early opposition from the American
Association of Medical Colleges and the Catholic Hospital Association
ing opposition through consensus building permitted other
influential organized political interests to gain amentum. The vocal
support of the two major hospital associati ons '
-the American Hospital
Association (AHA) and the Federation of American Hospitals (FAH)
--for
the Administration's proposal led to the emergence of bandwagoning.
Coupled with the endorsement of prospective payment by senior citizen
associations, this gave the legislation an image of inevitability. A
perception which led to its inclusion in the 1983 Social Security
Amendments, which insulated the proposal from any further significant
di stortion.
All the pieces came together in a manner strikingly similar to
Kingdon's scenario and the Medicare payment system was changed
fundamentally in 1983. This is a rare occurrence. The comprehensive
nature of Kingdon's framework helps to understand why substantial
breakthroughs in policy take place infrequently. More limited
theoretical constructs, such as David Brown's thesis that there must
be a congruent fit between health policy features and the structure of
political decision-making in the United States, are useful and point
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" the r,9ht direCti ° n bUt Suffer th eir partiaHty 1n focus
What ls evident from this study is that the health poiicy pnocess is
not unique. The convergence of positive factors in m3, which led to
Prospective payment legislation, are generic to al, basic changes in
public policy and not restricted to the health area. The
differentiating characteristic of health policies is that they must be
formulated to reflect unique aspects of the delivery system in the
United States, but their successful adoption reflects universal
aspects of the political system in the United States. Thus, Warmer
and Litman's perceptions of the uniqueness of the health policy
environment are, at least tentatively, called into question by the
case study. As in all case analyses, further research is needed
before firmer judgments can be confidently made.
The case study also confirms the predictions of Alford and Starr
that hospital administrators would emerge as key actors, challenging
physicians, in the health policy process. What would be fascinating
to explore is whether this eroded the traditional individualistic
ideology that has marked health policy in the United States. Will the
common perspectives of administrators, private and public, create a
professional community where corporate concepts of health care will
find a more fertile ground? Will state intervention become more
acceptable? Future developments may hold the promise of comprehensive
rather than piece-meal change. Regardless of what happens, the
politics of health policy" is a field that cries out for more
systematic study.
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Epilogue
It is difficult to ascertain the precise effects of prospective
payment because of the relatively short time since implementation of
the policy. Host of the analyses admit to the limitations in drawing
any decisive conclusions at this point in time. A report in the New
Eng land Journal of Medicine by John Iglehart presents data which
indicates that prospective payment is an effective mechanism for
containing Medicare hospitalization expenditures. According to
Iglehart, the effects of the new prospective payment system have been
extensive. By 1985, the reductions in Medicare expenditures, about
$40 billion, totaled 12 percent of all federal budget reductions,
despite the fact that the program represents only seven percent of
federal outlays. President Reagan’s budget proposal for fiscal 1987
called for additional Medicare reductions of $5.2 billion.
^
Despite Medicare expenditure reductions, hospitals have found
that the economic incentives, as a component of prospective payment,
are an effective management tool. The new prospective payment system
has improved clinical data collection and storage, focused the
attention of administrators and physicians on resource consumption,
and enabled many hospitals to realize a profit on Medicare business.
Since the implementation of prospective payment, the average
length of stay in hospitals has declined and hospitals have taken
steps to reduce expenses. There has been a substantial decrease in
the length of stay per admission from 9.9 days in early 1983 to 8.7
days in the third quarter of 1985. Admissions to non-federal acute
care hospitals have fallen from 9.58 million admissions in the first
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quarter of 1983 to 8.59 million by the third quarter of 1985.3 The
effects of the reduction in the length of stay and the decline in
ssions are reflected in the occupancy rates of hospitals which
fell from 74 percent in early 1983 to 63 percent by mid 1985.''
It is hard to determine definitely the finances of hospitals
under prospective payment because of conflicting reports and the
relatively short time period since the prcgram was implemented, but
early studies indicate that, despite the decline in occupancy, many
hospitals appear to have prospered under prospective payment.
According to a study conducted by the inspector general's office of
the Department of Health and Human Services, which examined hospital
cost reports, hospitals had an average net profit of 14.12 percent in
1984. The importance of this figure is realized when it is compared
to the prohibition of profits under cost based reimbursement. 5
Other health policy analyses of the impact of prospective payment
are less optimistic. Harvey Sapolsky claims that the policy
reflects the incongruence between the government's commitment to
accessible quality health care and cost
-containmen t which threatens
the United States health care delivery system. This is because the
enactment of prospective payment gave the government an economic
advantage in the health care delivery system which merely shifted the
existing burden of rising health costs to other federal programs,
private insurance companies, and consumers. Sapolsky predicts that
this shift may lead to the emergence of several unintended impacts. 6
The placement of increased economic burdens on inner city
hospitals is one of the potential negative impacts cited by Sapolsky.
110
Th.s may occur because these hospitals lack sufficient numbers of
privately insured patients to absorb the losses sustained when feting
the governments demands for price control. Another problem that
Sapol sky foresees as a result of the enactment of prospective payment
is the emergence of chains of day surgerv clinic. a„a „y i y y nmcs and emerg 1 center s
,
which could skim high-price, low cost, discount seeking patients from
hospitals. This pattern of health care delivery could strip away
profitable clients and destroy the complex web of cross
-subs id ies"
that supports teaching and services for the poor and rare or expensive
i 1 Inesses. 7
Another dissatisfaction with prospective payment voiced by
Sapol sky centers on the methodology used to determine the price that
the government will pay for any one treatment. Because DRGs were
derived from averages-the average cost for the average patient in the
average hospital, they may not adequately reflect the cost of health
services provided by the facility. This issue has been raised by
other health policy evaluators. Based on analysis of variations in
length of stay within DRGs, Berki, Ashcraft, and Newbrander call for
further research into the determination of an efficient and equitable
price for any given diagnosis. Berki concludes that the imprecision
in the DRG taxonomy introduces biases into the system which must be
eliminated if the system is to be equitable and efficient.
^
In light of his predictions of negative impacts, Sapol sky's
evaluation of prospective payment not less positive. Improvement in
the health care delivery system through the implementation of DRGs is
unlikely according to his analysis, and he concludes that prospective
Ill
payment will not 1 i vp nnP to its expectations and will eventually be
considered just another unsatisfactory reform. 9
A study which addresses the influence prospective payTOnt has had
on hospital productivity was done by Long, Ches ney
.Amen t
,
Pes
Harmas, Fleming, Kobrenshi, and Marshall The research analyze how
hospnal's products and productivity have been affected by the
implementation of prospective payment. The results of the research
indicate that prospective payment precipitated a slight decrease in
patients discharged to home; a slight increase in patients discharged
to short-term hospitals; a slight increase in patients discharged to
skilled nursing facilities; and a slight decrease in patients
discharged dead. Based on the data, the team concluded that there has
been a change in the hospital product as a result of the
implementation of prospective payment. Specifically, there was a
significant decrease in the number of patients discharged for whom the
hospital believes the entire episode of care is complete (discharged
to home). Conversely, there was an increase in the number of patients
discharged for whom further home health care was required. 10
The policy implications of the study identified by the research
team speak to the need to determine if decreasing costs in acute care
setting is really saving money or merely shifting the financial
burden. Because of the significant increase in the number of patients
being discharged prior to the completion of their episode of ill i ness
,
other components of the health care delivery system may be incurring
increased expenditures rendering this a zero sum strategy. A
mechanism that could potentially enhance quality care identified by
112
the research is the improvement in discharge planning, which would
insure the provision of care to patients until completion of the
episode of illness
.
11
The previous commentaries suggest that though the federal
government may be able to diminish its expenditures through the
implementation of a prospective reimbursement system, the overall
savings in health care costs may be significantly less than is
indicated by the statistics
.
12
Newcomer, Wood, and Sankar evaluated the ramifications that
prospective payment has had on the organization of hospitals,
community agencies, and families of senior citizens. According to
them, the management of hospitals has changed significantly since the
enactment of prospective payment. Greater economic efficiency has
become the focus of concern for admin i s t r a t o r s and caused
readjustments in nursing staffing patterns so as to increase
productivity. Certain economically inefficient services have been
eliminated or marketed to enhance profitability
.
13
Newcomer, Wood, and Sankar report that vertical integration of
services is another impact that prospective payment has had on
hospitals. Because of the increased discharges of patients who have
not completed their episode of illness, hospitals are developing their
own home-health agencies and skilled nursing facilities (SNF).
Vertical integration benefits hospitals because it enables them to
shift patients from a high cost to lower cost care setting making
money on both the sending and receiving ends. If a patient is
discharged to the institution's SNF, the hospitals are reimbursed the
113
amount designated by the appropriate ORG and the expense of the SNF
falls on another source within Medicare, Medicaid, or the patient's
private insurance. Vertical integration economically benefits the
hospital and creates a positive public iroge because it is a ^chanism
that enhances the appearance of improved continuity of care. 1 ''
Discharge planning has increased in response to the passage of
prospective payment. Data indicate that this is important if patients
are to receive appropriate care after leaving acute-care facilities.
The incorporation of discharge planning programs diminishes
compl l cations during the recovery period and protects the hospital
from potential liability as the acuity of patients at discharge
increases
.
15
The passage of prospective payment, according to the research
team, has several implications for community agencies. Skilled
nursing facilities will be relatively unaffected by the new policy
because they are unwilling to absorb the patients who are discharged
early and require extensive care. These facilities, which are in high
demand, tend to admit private paying patients with limited nursing
care requ i rements. This places a burden on hospitals to create their
own SNF or contract for a specified number of beds to insure timely
discharge of patients who have not completed their illness episode.^
Home-care agencies are one community facility for which Newcomer,
Wood, and Sankar predict significant growth. Since the enactment of
prospective payment, there has been a significant increase in the
number of Med icare-certi f ied propriety agencies. Institutionally
based agencies comprised the majority of these programs. The ultimate
114
effect of prospective parent on home-health agencies is yet to be
determined, but predictions include an increased need for skilled
nursing care, bigber salaries to attract skilled pmviders, and rapid
increases in Medicare expenditures for services. 17
Prospective payment also has implications for the families of
Medicare recipients who are strained when forced to take on the role
of caregiver. The impact on the family faced with early discharge of
a heavy care patient is difficult to estimate, but several studies
report the situation causes increased anxiety, decreased work
performance, and worsened financial status. Future policies.
Newcomer, Wood, and Sankar claim, should address these impacts through
provision of support for families in these circumstances. 18
They conclude that initial research indicates that prospective
payment has had a generally positive impact on hospitals, community
agencies, and families but caution that the ultimate effects are
ambiguous. Because of the relatively short period of time since
implementation of the policy authentati ve, statements about its impact
are inappropr iate.
Another response to prospective payment is reported by Lawrence
Brown who asserts that a new form of activity identified as
technocratic corporatism is emerging. Brown relates this development
to three changes caused by the shift of reimbursement from cost based
to price setting. The three changes are: (1) prospective payment was
the first occasion since the enactment of Medicare that gave program
administration a fundamental role in shaping a policy that changed the
program; (2) the change gave Medicare admini strators a new instrument
115
that could enhance their rolp in +h Q ~e refinement, interpretation, and
application of DRGs; and (3) the change moved the United States public
health insurance system toward a loosely corporate style of
negotiations. 20
The effect of these three alterations was to change the
government's role in health care delivery system from one of claims
processing to one of rate setting. This broadens the purview of
Medicare administrators beyond insurance to medical practice. This
new role requires new skills aTOng Medicare administrators, who must
be able to identify opportunities for “gaming” the system, realize the
implications of demographic patterns on demand for services, interpret
medical diagnoses, monitor quality, develop a severity-of-il lness
index, and analyze every aspect of the health care delivery system. 21
According to Brown, these changes have shifted power to
government a dm i n i s t r a t or s . The government's ability and
responsibility to direct the health care delivery system toward the
development of equitable and efficient care is thereby enhanced. Brown
states further that the Department of Health and Human Services should
address the implications prospective payment has for other aspects
of health care policy. One implication cited by Brown is the shift in
role definition between the federal and state goverments. He predicts
that states will probably adopt an all -payer system to avoid cost-
shifting. The form that cost -shifting will most likely take is the
movement toward increased expenditures for Medicaid reimbursement in
response to an increased need for SNF for patients who are discharged
prior to the completion of their illness episode. 22 Regardless of the
116
OUtCOme °f eVentS
’
BroW
" «>.t. unde, prospective payment, the
federal government's leverage relative to the states has increased
si gni f i cant ly
,
and he encourages federal administrators to study the
Situation carefully and grant waivers to states to develop a health
care delivery system that meets the new demands created by DRGs. 23
congress is concerned about the effects of prospective payment
and has been monitoring them since implementation of the system in
October 1983. Hearings were held before the Senate Special Committee
on Aging on September 26
.
1985 to discuss the impact of prospective
payment on quality care. In his opening statement, Senator Charles
Grassley (Republ ican-Iowa) stated the intent of the hearings:
V- 1, looking for people who say that the DRGs were
absolutely the wrong approach and it ought to be dumpedNow so far I have not heard that too much. It is mostly a
case that, yes, we had to do something in the area of cost
control and the DRGs are a place to start, but. And thenfrom that conjunction "but," there is a lot of movements in
a lot of different directions of ideas of how they ought to
be changed. y
But for instance, I want to hear if there is anybody who
believes that it was a mistake and we ought to go to square
one and not start over
,
or we ought to got to square one and
start over with something else.
None of the testimony at the hearings called for the termination
of prospective payment, but nearly all speakers indicated the
admission and discharge pattern changes occurring since the enactment
of prospective payment have created a new aggregate population
requiring home health care. Speakers requested increased funding for
home health agencies in order to provide care to Medicare recipients
and improved hospital discharge planning. Overall, prospective
117
payment was seen by each snpakpr .c ..y pe e as an effective and important means
of cost containment. 25
More recently, on April 23, 1986, hearings were held before the
House Ways and Means Committee on a bill that would ensure quality
health care to Medicare recipients. Throughout the hearings, speakers
cited the negative impacts of prospective payment. The consensus
appeared to be that there should be increased funding for home health
care to patients discharged prior to the completion of an illness
episode, catastrophic health insurance, and monitoring of the system
for potential negative impacts. 26
The Senate Finance Committee held similar hearings to examine the
effect of Medicare's prospective payment system on the quality of
care. Although nearly all of the testimony cited a significant
increase in early discharges and called for a growth in home health
care agencies, each admitted that conclusive data on the impact of
prospective payment are lacking. 27
The potential for a decreased quality of health care to Medicare
recipients according to a report by the Northwest Oregon Health
Systems has two major policy implications: an increase in screening of
patients to determine their degree of dependency at discharge; and an
increase in post -ho spi tal izati on care facilities. 2^ Other research
echoes this conclusion.
Clearly, more research is required before all of the effects
prospective payment has had on the nation's health are delineated.
Initial reports, although not conflicting, provide conflicting
interpretations of the policy's impact on health care. The program
118
appears to be ab,e to contain the federal governs expenditures
for hospitalization costs of Medicare recipients. But this does not
address the question of cost-shifting because the data examine only
one cost component in a complex health care delivery system. It may
be that prospective payment merely shifts costs to other delivery
centers such as home health agencies and that net benefits remain to
be calculated. Moreover, it may be that the resultant focus on
efficient management of health facilities will have a negative impact
the quality of health care. At this time, more analysis is needed
before advocates of a comprehensive overhaul of the system are likely
to get a serious hearing. This case study reveals that basic changes
in health policy are rare, episodic events growing out of unique
circumstances. What is probable is that some minor tinkering with the
system will occur as defects are brought to light over the next
several years. Fundamental reform awaits a longer passage of time.
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